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THE  PAST DECADE has witnessed increasing concern over the level  of 
business capital formation in the United States. By some measures there 
has been a sharp decline in the rate of capital formation, accompanied by 
a drastic reduction in the stock market's valuation of  corporate assets. 
Measured in 1981 dollars, the Dow Jones average stood at almost 2000 
in 1965.  This decline in investment and market valuation has occurred 
in conjunction with the substantial changes in the effective taxation of 
capital income  brought on  by  inflation. Although  causal  links  among 
these  developments  have  not  been  clearly established,  a consensus  in 
favor of  some  sort of  tax incentive for business capital formation has 
emerged. At present, however, there is no solid basis for assessing the 
likely impact of any given menu of tax policies on the level of investment 
or on the distribution of income. 
This paper presents an analysis of the effects of tax policy on capital 
accumulation and valuation based on James Tobin's q theory of invest- 
ment. As Tobin has explained, aggregate investment can be expected to 
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depend in a stable way on q, the ratio of the stock market valuation of 
existing capital to its replacement cost. For example, increases in the rate 
of return on physical capital raise its market value and cause increased 
investment until equilibrium is  restored. Although  models  linking the 
stock market to investment have been estimated, they have not previously 
been used to examine the impact of tax policies. The basic idea underlying 
the approach taken here can be described quite simply. It is generally as- 
sumed that the stock market valuation of corporate capital represents the 
present value of its future dividend stream. In the model of this paper, 
the effects of tax changes on future profits are used to estimate the impact 
of those changes on the stock market. These estimates in turn are used 
as a basis for gauging the impact of the tax changes on capital formation. 
This approach, working through q, can provide estimates of the effects of 
policy announcements and of personal tax reforms as well as estimates of 
the distributional impact of alternative reforms. A distinct feature of the 
model developed here is that it is rooted in a microeconomic theory that 
integrates the interests of the corporation and its shareholders. 
The paper begins with a review of recent trends in the rate of capital 
formation and in  certain key  investment determinants. Data  from the 
recently revised national income and product accounts are used to exam- 
ine the performance of real business fixed investment over the past three 
decades. Despite widespread concern about capital formation, the ratio 
of  real gross fixed nonresidential investment to  GNP  has,  if  anything, 
been high in the 1970s relative to postwar norms. The ratio of capital to 
output has actually risen since 1970. Other indicators suggest more cause 
for concern, however. Net  investment, after adjustment for investment 
mandated by regulation, shows  a dramatic decline in the past decade. 
This  decline is of  particular concern because  the sharp rise in energy 
prices and the high rate of labor force growth called for increases in the 
rate of investment. The  data also indicate that the tax burden on  cor- 
porate capital income flowing to the holders of equity has not increased 
greatly during the  1970s.  Reductions in statutory rates have offset the 
impact of inflation. 
The q theory of investment underlying the estimates of tax policy im- 
pacts is described in the second section of the paper. It is shown that, 
under certain restrictive assumptions, the  value  of  q,  as  measured in 
financial markets, can be closely linked to the shadow price of new capital 
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costs. The way in which particular tax policies  affect investment is also 
examined. Both the investment and distributional effects of tax incentives 
depend critically on the form they take. Through judicious combination 
of tax policies, it is possible to spur investment while minimizing the wind- 
fall of income or wealth to existing corporate shareholders. These wind- 
falls have important distributional consequences because almost all cor- 
porate shares are beneficially owned by wealthy individuals. 
In the third part of the paper the empirical procedures for evaluating 
investment incentives  are described. Investment equations using  "tax- 
adjusted q" as an explanatory variable are shown to have somewhat more 
explanatory power  than equations that rely on  the  q variable that  is 
customarily used. Tax adjustments also provide a partial explanation for 
the anomalously low values of q that have occurred recently. The assump- 
tions  about production technology  and corporate financial policy  that 
underlie the simulations of tax changes are also discussed. 
In the fourth part of the paper I examine the effects of changes in real 
tax rates, either legislated or caused by inflation in the absence of index- 
ation of  the  tax system. The  analysis indicates  that if  changes in  tax 
policy or inflation do not affect the real after-tax rate of return required 
by individual investors, inflation is likely to have a substantial negative 
impact on both investment and the stock market. Statutory reforms are 
also likely to have important effects. The elimination of taxes on capital 
gains would, for example, raise capital intensity by 18 percent in the long 
run. However, the empirical estimates suggest that the adjustment process 
is much slower than is usually assumed, with a half-life of more than a 
decade. The calculations also illustrate the wide range of distributional 
consequences of different incentives. 
Most analyses of the impact of tax policy on investment, including this 
one, assume that tax reforms have no effect on the real after-tax rate of 
return required by investors in the corporate sector. This is equivalent to 
postulating a perfectly elastic supply of funds to the business sector. It is 
argued in the fifth part of the paper that this assumption is plausible, both 
because the business sector is small relative to the entire capital market 
and because the overall savings rate is likely to be sensitive to the after-tax 
rate of return. The analysis of changes in real tax rates induced by infla- 
tion requires some modification of this assumption since inflation affects 
the return to investment in all sectors, not just the corporate sector. The 
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constant real required rate of return. Even small permanent changes in 
the required rate of return have large estimated impacts on the level of 
investment. This sensitivity suggests that the determinants of the required 
rate might be an important topic for further research. 
Trends in the Rate of Business Capital Formation 
In this section, I examine trends in the rate of nonresidential capital 
formation using data from the recently revised national income and prod- 
uct accounts, which significantly increased the estimated rate of invest- 
ment compared with previous data on those accounts. Alternative indica- 
tors of trends in capital formation can be constructed from the accounts 
data,  and  these  provide  quite  different pictures  of  how  these  trends 
changed. 
HISTORICAL  COMPARISONS 
Various  measures of  the  rate of  investment  are shown  in  table  1. 
Columns 1 and 2 suggest that there is little cause for concern about capi- 
tal formation during the 1970s.  The share of nonresidential investment 
in GNP was larger than it was in either of the other postwar decades. The 
ratio of the net capital stock to potential output was higher at the end of 
the 1970s than at the beginning. The rate of growth of this ratio, however, 
does show a substantial decline.1 
Column 3 tracks the performance of net investment.2 This concept is 
appropriate to the analysis of capital accumulation since interest centers 
on the rate of increase of productive capacity. The net investment measure 
indicates a significant investment shortfall during the late 1970s. The net 
investment share in GNP averaged only 2.6  percent between  1975  and 
1979 compared with 3.1 percent during the entire 1948-79  period. This 
1. In standard  models with labor-augmenting  change, the capital-output  ratio is 
an indicator of capital intensity. If, however, technical change is not strictly labor- 
augmenting,  the ratio will trend through time. 
2.  The calculation of net investment is obviously sensitive to assumptions  about 
depreciation. These calculations are based on straight-line depreciation with life- 
times that are 0.85 of those of the Internal Revenue Service Bulletin F (1942).  The 
results are similar using alternative depreciation measures, except that rates of net 
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occurred despite the cyclical expansion during this interval. The decline 
in net investment relative to  gross investment reflects a rising capital- 
output ratio, which increases the share of depreciation in GNP, and a shift 
in  the  composition  of  investment  toward  equipment  and  away  from 
structures. 
Although  investment in  pollution  control  and  safety  may  improve 
health and general welfare, it does not augment productive capacity or 
contribute to GNP. It is therefore appropriate to subtract much of this 
investment in assessing investment performance during the late  1970s. 
Only data on direct pollution control expenditures are available. When 
these expenditures are subtracted, as shown in column 4, the data show 
significant recent weakness. As column 5 shows, the rate of investment by 
this measure was lower than in any other postwar interval, and was only 
three-quarters  of its postwar average rate. The rate of growth of the capi- 
tal stock itself also shows a significant decline relative to earlier experi- 
ence. Indeed, the rate of net capital formation recently fell below the rate 
in the late 1950s, when a deficiency in capital formation was almost uni- 
versally acknowledged. The ratio of real capital to employment actually 
declined over the 1974-79  period. 
The  adequacy of  business investment cannot be  assessed by  simple 
comparisons of recent and historical experience; a variety of factors affect 
the desirable level  of  investment. There have been  several changes in 
recent years that may have  significantly lowered  the  optimal  level  of 
business investment. The  coming of  age of  the baby-boom  generation 
probably should  have led  to  a redirection of  investment expenditures 
from business investment toward housing. Conceivably, the productivity 
slowdown could reflect a slowdown in technical change that has reduced 
the optimal level of investment. Indeed, it may be that the observed de- 
cline in investment simply represents a return to normalcy after aberrant 
behavior in the late 1960s.3 
There are, however, two major factors that should have led to increases 
in the measured rate of net investment during the  1970s.  They suggest 
that the moderate declines actually reflect a substantial shortfall relative 
3. It does not appear that the low level of investment during the 1970s is the 
result of cyclical factors. In earlier work, I reported cyclically adjusted  rates of in- 
vestment, which demonstrated that only a negligible fraction of the shortfall can 
be traced to cyclical factors. See Lawrence H. Summers,  "Tax Policy and Corporate 
Investment,"  Conference  on  Supply  Side  Economics,  Federal  Reserve  Bank  of  St. 
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Table 1. Postwar Investment Trends, 1948-80  and Selected Periodsa 
Annual 
Share  growth 
Share  Share  of net  rate of 
of gross  Ratio of  of net  productive  net capital 
investment  capital  investment  investment  stock 
Year  and  in GNP  to outputb  in GNP  in GNPC  (percent) 
period  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5) 
1948  0.104  0.691  0.044  0.044  8.0 
1949  0.093  0.693  0.030  0.030  4.7 
1950  0.093  0.697  0.032  0.032  5.0 
1951  0.091  0.700  0.031  0.031  5.0 
1952  0.087  0.697  0.025  0.025  3.9 
1953  0.090  0.699  0.028  0.028  4.3 
1954  0.090  0.698  0.024  0.024  3.4 
1955  0.093  0.704  0.029  0.029  4.3 
1956  0.097  0.711  0.032  0.032  4.5 
1957  0.097  0.716  0.030  0.030  4.1 
1958  0.087  0.707  0.018  0.018  2.3 
1959  0.088  0.703  0.021  0.021  2.8 
1960  0.091  0.701  0.024  0.024  3.2 
1961  0.088  0.697  0.021  0.021  2.8 
1962  0.090  0.697  0.025  0.025  3.5 
1963  0.090  0.696  0.026  0.026  3.6 
1964  0.094  0.700  0.031  0.031  4.4 
1965  0.105  0.715  0.042  0.042  6.0 
1966  0.110  0.734  0.047  0.047  6.7 
1967  0.104  0.746  0.041  0.039  5.4 
1968  0.103  0.757  0.039  0.038  5.1 
1969  0.107  0.770  0.041  0.039  5.4 
1970  0.105  0.775  0.035  0.033  4.2 
1971  0.100  0.773  0.029  0.026  3.3 
1972  0.102  0.775  0.031  0.028  3.9 
1973  0.110  0.786  0.040  0.036  5.2 
1974  0.109  0.792  0.035  0.031  4.3 
1975  0.097  0.783  0.019  0.015  2.1 
1976  0.097  0.774  0.020  0.016  2.2 
1977  0.103  0.772  0.026  0.023  3.1 
1978  0.107  0.774  0.031  0.028  3.7 
1979  0.110  0.781  0.033  0.030  4.0 
1980  0.107  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  n.a. Lawrence H. Summers  73 
Table 1 (continued) 
Annual 
Share  growth 
Share  Share  of net  rate of 
of gross  Ratio of  of net  productive  net capital 
investment  capital  investment  investment  stock 
Year and  in GNP  to Outputb  in GNP  in GNPC  (percent) 
period  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5) 
Average 
1948-79  0.098  0.731  0.031  0.029  4.2 
1950-54  0.090  0.698  0.028  0.028  4.3 
1955-59  0.092  0.708  0.026  0.026  3.6 
1960-64  0.091  0.698  0.025  0.025  3.7 
1965-69  0.106  0.744  0.042  0.041  5.7 
1970-74  0.105  0.780  0.034  0.031  4.2 
1975-79  0.103  0.777  0.026  0.022  3.0 
Source:  U.S.  Department of  Commerce, Bureau of  Economic  Analysis, and  Council  of  Economic 
Advisers. 
n.a.  Not available. 
a.  Refers to real nonresidential fixed investment and capital stock. Calculation of net figures is based 
on straight-line depreciation. 
b.  The ratio of net fixed nonresidential capital stock to potential output, as calculated by the Council 
of Economic Advisers. 
c.  Calculated by subtracting  direct pollution control expenditures from investment. 
to what would have been socially desirable. First, the increase in energy 
prices and other supply shocks that occurred almost certainly have has- 
tened the obsolescence of some capital goods. Thus depreciation has been 
understated in the national accounts and net investment overstated. It is 
difficult to gauge the magnitude of this effect, but there is some evidence 
that it is likely to be substantial; conservative estimates place it near 0.5 
percent of GNP a year.4  If this estimate is correct, the true rate of produc- 
tive capital formation during the past five years has been only 1.7 percent 
of GNP, representing about half  its rate during the  1960s.  In addition, 
the energy shocks should have provided an extra stimulus to direct energy 
investment, a development that should also have raised overall invest- 
ment. 
A second factor that should have raised investment relative to recent 
and historical experience is the recent rapid rate of growth in labor sup- 
4.  Martin Baily's paper in  this  issue suggests this  effect  is  very  important. 
Ronald G. Ridker and William D. Watson estimate 0.5 percent of GNP as a lower 
limit on the increased  turnover  of the capital stock due to higher energy prices. See 
their  To  Choose  a Future:  Resource  and  Environmental  Consequences  of  Alterna- 
tive Growth  Paths (Johns Hopkins University Press, 1980). 74  Brookings Papers on Economic  Activity,  1:1 981 
ply. The volume of private business employment rose by an average of 
1.3 percent a year between 1949 and 1974, but by 3.1 percent a year be- 
tween 1974 and 1979. The growth rate of total hours of work showed an 
even more dramatic increase. This increase in the rate of growth of labor 
input might have been expected to lead to an increase in the rate of capital 
input. In fact, the decline in the rate of growth of the capital stock has 
been so large that the ratio of real capital to employment actually de- 
clined over the 1974-79  period.5 
Before turning to an examination of what has happened to the effective 
taxation of equity income of corporations, it is important to stress that 
the recent performance of investment does not necessarily have any im- 
plications for tax policy. The optimum level  of investment depends on 
complex social, economic, and ethical factors, and not on some arbitrary 
historical norm.6 
TAXATION  OF  CORPORATE  CAPITAL  INCOME 
The lion's share of nonresidential investment in the United States is 
undertaken by corporations. As is now well understood, inflation leads to 
substantial nonneutralities in the taxation of  corporate source income. 
In this section a brief effort is made to determine what has happened to 
the effective tax rate at all levels of the tax system on the real equity in- 
come received by investors in the corporate sector. These estimates cap- 
ture the effects of inflation, statutory reductions in the corporate tax rate, 
increases in the investment tax credit, and rapid depreciation allowances. 
Table 2 provides estimates of inflation-adjusted corporate equity in- 
come and various components of the tax on it.7 Inflation-adjusted income, 
shown  in  column  1, is  calculated  by  adjusting profits in  the  national 
income and product accounts for the effects of inflation on the value of 
firms' debts. This is done by adding to profits the rate of inflation multi- 
5.  See Economic  Report  of  the President,  January  1981,  table  9, p. 71. 
6.  For an analysis of the case for spurring business investment, see Summers, 
"Tax Policy and Corporate  Investment." 
7.  A more extensive discussion of these issues may be found in Martin Feldstein 
and Lawrence H. Summers, "Inflation  and the Taxation of Capital Income in the 
Corporate Sector," National Tax Journal, vol.  32 (December 1979),  pp. 445-70. 
See also Martin Feldstein and James Poterba, "State  and Local Taxes and the Rate 
of Return on the Non-Financial Corporate  Capital,"  Working Paper 508 (National 
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Table  2. Effective  Taxation  of Corporate  Equity  Income,  1953-79a 
Billions  of dollars  unless otherwise  specified 
Inflation- 
adjusted  Capital  Total 
corporate  Corporate  Dividend  gains  tax rate 
profits  taxes  taxes  taxes  (percent) 
Year  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5) 
1953  30.6  18.5  2.8  0.5  71.5 
1954  28.9  15.6  2.9  0.4  65.6 
1955  38.6  20.2  3.4  0.7  62.7 
1956  36.7  20.1  3.5  0.7  66.4 
1957  36.4  19.1  3.6  1.1  65.0 
1958  31.2  16.2  3.5  0.7  65.7 
1959  41.0  20.7  3.8  0.9  61.8 
1960  38.5  19.2  3.9  0.8  62.2 
1961  38.9  19.5  4.0  0.7  62.0 
1962  46.6  20.6  4.2  1.1  55.5 
1963  52.3  22.8  4.6  1.2  54.7 
1964  58.8  24.0  4.6  1.4  51.0 
1965  69.3  27.2  5.0  1.8  49.0 
1966  75.5  29.5  5.4  2.2  49.3 
1967  71.9  27.7  5.8  2.1  49.4 
1968  79.3  33.4  6.5  2.6  53.6 
1969  75.2  33.1  6.4  3.9  57.6 
1970  61.6  27.0  6.1  3.7  59.6 
1971  70.9  29.8  6.1  4.1  56.3 
1972  80.9  33.6  6.3  4.1  54.4 
1973  93.8  40.0  6.5  6.1  56.1 
1974  93.7  42.0  6.7  10.0  62.7 
1975  108.4  41.2  8.1  9.6  54.3 
1976  123.6  52.6  9.7  7.9  56.8 
1977  148.1  59.4  10.7  10.3  54.4 
1978  165.9  67.3  12.2  12.4  55.4 
1979  180.0  69.7  13.0  12.1  52.7 
Source: Calculations by the author, as described in the text. 
a.  Refers to nonfinancial corporate business. 76  Brookings Papers on Economic  Activity,  1:1  981 
plied by the book value of indebtedness. The profits are already adjusted 
for the effects of historical cost depreciation and FIFO (first in, first out) 
inventory accounting. Three components of the taxation of this income 
need to be considered. Profits tax liabilities are shown in column 2. These 
are taken directly from the national income and product accounts data. 
The estimates of dividend taxes, reported in column 3, are based on an 
examination of  the tax rates faced by different categories of  corporate 
stockholders.8 The average tax rate varies relatively little over the sample 
period from 40  percent in  1955  to  31  percent in  1973.9 Fluctuations 
reflect both changing tax regulations and movements in the composition 
of  equity ownership. Column  4  presents  estimates of  accrued capital 
gains taxes derived by assuming that accrued capital gains are equal to 
the sum of retained earnings and the nominal appreciation of the capital 
stock, measured at replacement cost.10  The calculation of effective capital 
gains rates, like that of dividend tax rates, involves averaging over differ- 
ent categories of investors. The estimates take account of the deferral of 
tax payments until realization and the fact that many capital gains are not 
taxed because of the death of the share owner. These features lead to a 
very low rate of capital gains taxation, averaging about 5 percent over 
the sample period. 
Column 5 of the table shows the effective tax rate on equity income 
when all these taxes are added together. Two  features of the numbers 
merit comment. First, the tax rate is much lower than estimates presented 
by Martin Feldstein and me of the total tax rate on all capital income 
arising in the corporate sector. This is because the tax rate on corporate 
income paid to bondholders, which is included in our earlier calculations 
8. The calculation explicitly recognizes the existence of a variety of institutions 
such as pension plans, Individual Retirement  Accounts, and Keogh plans, which al- 
low dividends  to escape taxation. 
9. This tax rate is calculated as the ratio of estimated tax collections to reported 
dividends. The estimate is roughly consistent with the results of studies that have 
examined stock prices the day dividends are paid. For example, see Alan J. Auer- 
bach, "Stockholder  Tax Rates and Firm Attributes,"  unpublished,  Harvard Univer- 
sity, June 1981. 
10. In any given year, measured  capital gains are likely to differ from this figure 
because of recapitalizations  due to information about future prospects of firms or 
changes in the discount rate. Because the aim here is to focus on the taxation of re- 
turns  to investment,  these recapitalizations  are ignored. Lawrence H. Summers  77 
but excluded from this one, is over 100 percent due to the very low level 
of real interest rates. Second, there does not appear to have been a sizable 
increase in the taxation of equity income during the last decade. The stat- 
utory tax reductions in the form of accelerated depreciation, increases in 
the investment tax credit, and the recent reduction in the corporate tax 
rate have more than offset the positive impact of inflation on the taxation 
of corporate capital. These data do not contradict the assertion that the 
interaction between  inflation and  taxes  has  adversely  affected capital 
formation. Rather, they indicate that these  effects have worked either 
through a reduction in saving due to a reduced real after-tax interest rate 
or that they have been offset by changes in the tax laws. The historical 
data are not necessarily indicative of future developments. Even if the 
rate of inflation remains stable, with unchanged tax laws the effective tax 
rate on corporate capital will continue to rise because of historical cost 
depreciation. 
The fact that effective tax rates did not rise during the 1970s does not 
by itself invalidate the case for tax reform. Appropriate tax policy  de- 
pends on social objectives and the effects of reform, not consistency with 
historical norms. In the next part of the paper I develop a methodology 
for evaluating the effects of  tax policies  on  capital formation and the 
distribution of wealth. 
Taxes in a q Theory of Investment 
This  section  describes  a  procedure for  using  investment  equations 
based on Tobin's q as a basis for estimating the impact of tax policies on 
both investment and the stock market. The essential insight underlying 
Tobin's theory is that, in a taxless world, firms invest as long  as each 
dollar spent purchasing capital raises the market value  of  the firm by 
more than one dollar. Tobin assumes that, to a good approximation, the 
market value of an additional unit of capital equals the average market 
value of the existing capital stock-that  is, average q, which is the ratio 
of the market value of the capital stock to its replacement cost, is a good 
proxy for the value of the marginal q on an additional dollar of invest- 
ment. It is natural then to assume that the rate of investment is an increas- 
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This approach has several advantages over more conventional theories 
of investment. Perhaps most important, the q theory is supply-oriented. 
In the formulation below,  firms make decisions  on  output and capital 
intensity simultaneously. This captures an important response to invest- 
ment stimuli. Firms are encouraged to supply more output by a reduction 
in the cost of capital. This response is missing in most investment theories 
in which the level  of output is taken as predetermined.11  As  shown in 
appendix A, the q theory of investment can be derived by assuming that 
firms face  adjustment costs and make investment and output decisions 
with the objective of maximizing market value. 
A second advantage of q theory is that it can be used readily to eval- 
uate a wide menu of policy proposals. Almost all the empirical literature 
on tax policy and investment neglects entirely the taxes levied on individ- 
uals. These taxes are difficult to introduce into investment equations con- 
taining a flexible accelerator. Because they do have an impact on stock 
market values, individual income taxes are easily handled by the q-theory 
approach. In addition, because the q theory is derivable directly from the 
assumption of intertemporal optimization, it is ideally suited for evalua- 
tion of the effects of policy  announcements and comparing permanent 
and temporary policies. Similarly, the approach is forward-looking and 
so can be used to study the effects of future policies on current investment. 
As Robert Lucas has emphasized, econometric investment equations that 
do not incorporate rational adaptation to  changes in policy  cannot be 
used to predict the effects of those fundamental changes.12  The approach 
developed here is not subject to this criticism because the only param- 
eters that are estimated are technological and do not depend on the policy 
11. Peter K. Clark  presents  a review of these approaches  and uses them to explain 
investment  during  the 1970s. See his "Investment  in the 1970s: Theory, Performance, 
and Prediction,"  BPEA, 1:1979, pp. 73-113. 
12. See Robert E. Lucas, Jr. "Econometric Price Evaluation: A  Critique," in 
Karl  Brunner  and Allan  H.  Metzler,  eds.,  The  Phillips  Curve  and  Labor  Markets, 
Carnegie-Rochester  Conference Series on Public Policy, vol. 1 (Amsterdam: North- 
Holland, 1976), pp. 19-46. This criticism is appropriate  at two levels. First, most 
approaches  of the type used in policy evaluation exercises do not distinguish  current 
and future values of variables. Thus there is no way to use them to investigate the 
effect of an announced  change in policy. Implicitly, they assume that all tax parame- 
ters are expected to  remain permanently constant. Second, because expected tax 
changes are an important  feature of the historical experience,  the equations are mis- 
specified so that parameter  estimates are unlikely to be reliable. The importance  of 
these problems  is demonstrated  by the simulations  below. Lawrence H. Summers  79 
rule; the theory shows how the implications of rational expectations of 
future events for optimal investment are appropriately captured in market 
values.13 
The derivation of  the q theory of investment in this paper becomes 
more complex when financial and tax policies are modeled in full gener- 
ality. It is useful to begin by considering a highly simplified model that 
highlights some of  the main issues before introducing a realistic treat- 
ment of tax and financial policies. 
THE  BASIC  MODEL 
The dynamics of investment and market valuation are considered in a 
model in which there is no inflation, capital does not depreciate, invest- 
ment is financed through retained earnings, and the only tax is a propor- 
tional levy on corporate income. In this setting it is reasonable to assume 
that investment depends on the ratio of the market value of existing capi- 
tal to its replacement cost. Unless an investment of one dollar increases 
the market value of the firm by more than one dollar, there is no reason 
to invest. Given the costs of adjustments and lags in recognition and im- 
plementation, there is no reason to expect that all investments that in- 
crease market value by more than their cost will be made immediately. As 
Tobin has argued, these considerations lead to an investment equation of 
the form 
(1)  I =  I (K)  K 
I(1) =O  I'  > O, 
where I represents gross investment and V/K  is the q ratio of market 
value to replacement cost.  14 Since inflation is assumed to be zero, the price 
of capital can be taken to be  1. The assumption that the ratio I/K  de- 
13. Alternative approaches to investment exist that are also not subject to the 
Lucas critique. These involve the specification of  fixed delivery lags for  capital 
goods. For empirical application but not estimation using such approaches, see 
Robert E. Hall and Knut A. Mork, "Energy  Prices and the U.S. Economy in 1979- 
1980," The Energy Journal, vol.  1 (April 1980),  pp. 41-53;  and Robert E. Hall, 
"The Macroeconomic Impact of Changes in Income Taxes in the Short and Me- 
dium Runs,"  Journal  of Political Economy, vol. 86, pt. 2 (April 1978), pp. S71-S85. 
14. James Tobin, "A General Equilibrium Approach To  Monetary Theory," 
Journal of Money,  Credit and Banking,  vol.  1 (February  1969),  pp.  15-29. 80  Brookings  Papers  on Economic  Activity, 1:1981 
pends on q ensures that the growth rate of the capital stock is independent 
of the scale of the economy. It is important to recognize that the invest- 
ment schedule given by equation 1 is a technological relation that depends 
on the adjustment cost function. 
The analysis below is illustrative; adjustment costs are not explicitly 
recognized. An important assumption of this approach is that capital is 
homogeneous. If capital is heterogeneous, shocks may reduce the market 
value of existing capital but raise the return on new investment. Recent 
energy shocks illustrate this phenomenon.15 
It is assumed that equity owners require a fixed real rate of return to 
induce them to hold the existing stock of equity. This return comes in the 
form of dividends-equal  to after-tax profits minus retained earnings for 
new investment-and  capital gains. Hence the condition, 
(2)  p  v  +  V' 
where p is the real after-tax rate of return, Div  is dividends, and  V is 
dV/dt;  and equation 2 implies16 
(3)  ~  VpV  -(1  -r)  F'(K)K  +  I  (K-)Kg 
where T is the corporate tax rate, and the production function, with labor 
input fixed, is given by F(K).  Because it is assumed that the economy's 
fixed labor stock is fully employed, the rate of profit, F'(K),  declines as 
the capital stock increases. It will be convenient to examine the dynamics 
in terms of K and q. Equations 1 and 3 imply that the system's equations 
of motion are 
(4)  K =  I(q)K 
(5)  =  [p -  I(q)]  q +  I(q) -  (1 -  r)F'(K). 
The steady-state properties of the model are easily found by imposing 
15. Martin Baily's paper in this issue argues for the importance of such effects. 
However, empirical efforts to verify a divergence between marginal and average q 
have not been successful. See John P. Shoven and Arthur B. Slepian, "The Effects 
of Factor Price Changes on Replacement Investment and Market Valuation," Dis- 
cussion Paper 19 (Workshop on the Microeconomics of  Inflation, Stanford Uni- 
versity, October 1978). 
16. Here and throughout  the paper a dot above a variable denotes the derivative 
of that variable  with respect  to time. Lawrence H. Summers  81 





the conditions K =  0 and q  0. These imply 
(6)  q =  I-1 (O) =  1 
(7)  p =  (  -  r)F'(K). 
Equation 6 indicates that in the steady state the value of q must equal 1 
so that the market value of capital goods equals their replacement cost. 
Equation 7 indicates that, in equilibrium, firms equate their net marginal 
product of capital with the cost of capital. Inspection of equations 6 and 7 
makes clear that a change in the corporate tax rate affects the steady-state 
capital stock but has no effect on steady-state q because the change does 
not influence the cost to the firm of acquiring new capital goods. 
The dynamics of adjustment following a tax change are illustrated in 
figure 1, a phase diagram representing equations 4 and 5.17  In the figure, 
the arrows depict the equations of motion of the system when it is not in 
17. Note that the figure  is drawn  to correspond  to the empirically  relevant case in 
which dividends are positive. For sufficiently  large q, the 4 =  0 schedule would be 
negatively  sloped. 82  Brookings Papers on Economic  Activity,  1:1981 
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equilibrium. The dark line represents the saddle-point path along which 
the system will converge to a steady state."8  A reduction in the corporate 
tax rate does not immediately affect the capital stock. The  value  of  q 
jumps from E1 to B, as shown in figure 2. As capital is accumulated, the 
marginal product of capital falls and the system converges to E2, where 
q is again equal to its equilibrium value. This path assumes that investors 
have perfect foresight and take account of the capital losses that occur as 
capital is accumulated. An  alternative assumption is that the investors 
have myopic expectations and fail to foresee the effects of capital accumu- 
lation. In this case, the system jumps from E1 to A and then converges to 
E2 along the 4 =  0 schedule; along this transition path investors con- 
sistently earn less than their required rate of return. 
18. The knife-edge stability of  the saddle-point path is a common feature of 
models with asset prices. Andrew B. Abel was the first  to use an approach  of this type 
to analyze investment incentives. See his "Empirical  Investment Equations: An In- 
tegrative Framework,"  in Karl Brunner  and Allan H. Metzler, eds., On the State of 
Macro-Economics,  Carnegie-Rochester  Conference Series on Public Policy, vol. 12 
(Amsterdam:  North-Holland, 1980), pp. 39-91. Lawrence  H. Summers  83 
Equations 4 and 5 can be solved numerically to find the path of q and 
the capital stock  that would  follow  any shift in  q,  independent of  its 
source. Shocks that might affect q include announcements of future tax 
policy changes as well as temporary or permanent policy measures. All 
that is necessary is knowledge of the form of the production function and 
the q investment relation. However, realistic estimates require taking ac- 
count of the complexities of the tax code, corporate financial policy, and 
the consequences of inflation. The nature of the modifications required by 
these factors is discussed heuristically below. 
ADDING  TAX  EFFECTS 
The formulation above abstracts from a number of important aspects 
of  reality, including debt finance, personal taxes,  and depreciation. In 
this section, I show how to construct a tax-adjusted q, hereafter denoted 
Q, which can be used in a correctly specified investment equation.  (A 
formal derivation of Q is provided in appendix A.)  I begin by introducing 
debt finance. It is assumed that firms finance a fraction, b, of new invest- 
ment by issuing debt. Hence  they continue to invest as long as the in- 
crease in equity value from a new investment exceeds its cost,  1 -  b, to 
equity holders. Recognition of debt therefore leads to a simple modifica- 
tion of the investment equation: 
(8)  K=  h(  j+b  -)  =  h(Q) 
h(O) = O  h' >  O, 
where pK  is  the  nominal  value  of  the  capital  stock.  The  expression 
(V/pK)  +  b is Tobin's q variable as normally defined. 
The next step is to introduce a tax or subsidy on the effective purchase 
price of new capital goods. The investment tax credit directly reduces the 
real acquisition cost of new capital goods; the knowledge that the pur- 
chase of a new capital good carries with it a stream of future tax-deductible 
depreciation allowances has a similar effect. These two factors reduce the 
effective price of capital goods from (1  -  b)  to  (1  -  b -  ITC  -Z), 
where ITC is the investment tax credit and Z is the present value of the 
tax savings from the depreciation deductions arising on a new investment 
of one dollar. This cost must be compared with the increase in the market 
value that results from the purchase. Under the assumption stated above 84  Brookings Papers on Economic  Activity,  1:1981 
-that  capital is homogeneous-the  increase in the stock market value of 
a firm brought about by an extra dollar of investment is  (V  -  B)/pK, 
where B is the present value of the tax savings due to depreciation deduc- 
tions on existing capital. These must be subtracted because they are not 
related to new capital; Z already takes account of the depreciation allow- 
ances expected on new capital. These adjustments lead to the investment 
equation, 
(9)  I  =h(V-B_  1+b+ITC+Z)  =h(Q) 
h(O)  = 0  h' > 0. 
Next it is necessary to take account of taxes levied on the individual for 
dividends and capital gains. At the margin, the firm is faced with a choice 
between retaining and investing a dollar or paying it out as dividends. 
Because the rate of dividend taxation exceeds the rate of capital gains 
taxation, firms invest past the point at which a dollar of retained earnings 
raises market value by one dollar. In particular, they will retain earnings 
until this last dollar raises market value by  (1  -  0)/(1  -c)  dollars. 
This implies that equation 9 should be modified to 
(10)  =  h (V  ) (I  c) _  I +  b +  ITC +  Z)  =h(Q) 
h(O)  = O  h' >  O, 
where 0 and c are the marginal tax rate on dividends and the effective 
capital gains rate, respectively. 
The final modification is to  recognize that adjustment costs  are ex- 
pensed. This implies that firms invest until the market value of the addi- 
tional  capital  minus  its  acquisition  cost  equals  the  after-tax  cost  of 
installation. When the corporate tax rate rises, marginal installation costs 
decline on an after-tax basis so investment increases, other things being 
equal. This consideration leads to the final expression for Q: 
(V  B)  (1  c)  +  b +  ITC +  Z  h(Q) 
(I1)  K(1-)  (1-)  TC+Z) 
h(O)  = 0  h' > 0. 
A more formal statement of this expression is presented in appendix A. Lawrence H. Summers  85 
Figure 3. Increase in the Investment Tax Credit 
v 
>~~~~~~  if_ 
K 
Equation 11 characterizes the motion of the capital stock. In order to 
analyze this model it is also necessary to describe the evolution of V/pK, 
denoted by v.19  It is not difficult to show that it evolves according to the 
equation, 
(12)  p  p +  r  (-  )Div(7 
(12)  (1-c)  (l  c)  pK  -v  K 
where r is the rate of inflation. 
Figure 3 shows a phase diagram for equations 1  1 and 12 for given tax 
parameters. As in figure 1, the equations and diagram can be interpreted 
as referring  to the entire economy rather than an individual firm. Qualita- 
tively the diagram looks like the one shown in figure 1. However, if the 
economy is growing it is necessary to interpret K as the ratio of capital to 
labor. The diagram also exhibits saddle-point stability. Again there is a 
19. This expression follows immediately from the definition of  v and equation 
A-I in appendix  A. 86  Brookings Papers on Economic  Activity,  1:1981 




unique path, indicated by the dark line, along which the system converges 
to equilibrium. On this path, which assumes perfect foresight, investment 
is just sufficient to validate the market's expectations about future divi- 
dends. This phase diagram can be used to study the relations among tax 
changes, market valuation, and investment. 
Consider an increase in the investment tax credit as shown in figure 3. 
Both schedules shift: the K =  0 schedule shifts downward because the 
investment tax credit reduces the effective purchase price of new capital 
goods, and the  -  =  0 schedule shifts to the right because the investment 
tax credit raises after-tax profits. The diagram shows that the steady-state 
capital stock unambiguously increases. In the long run the value of v falls 
because the credit reduces the  "effective" replacement cost  of  capital 
goods. The  short-run impact on  stock market valuation is ambiguous, 
depending on the rapidity of adjustment. It is possible for v to jump to 
any level between A, which corresponds to no capital stock adjustment, 
and B, which corresponds to an instantaneous adjustment of the capital 
stock. It is thus possible that the stock market may decline even though Lawrence H. Summers  87 
Figure 5. Announcement Effect: Dividend Tax Increase 
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investment has been encouraged. Exactly parallel results hold for a de- 
cline in the capital gains tax rate or for an acceleration of tax depreciation. 
An  increase in the corporate tax rate, as shown in figure 4,  has an 
ambiguous effect on long-run capital accumulation. The v =  0 schedule 
is likely to shift to the left, reflecting the effect of increased taxes in re- 
ducing dividends and the K =  0 schedule will shift downward because of 
the expensing of  adjustment costs  and the  increased value  of  the  tax 
deduction for depreciation. Hence  the value of  the market will unam- 
biguously decline in the short run, but the short-run impact on investment 
and the long-run effects on the capital stock are indeterminate. 
One advantage of the investment theory developed here is that it can 
easily be used to analyze the effects of both temporary and announced, 
but not yet implemented, tax changes. Figure 5 illustrates the effects of an 
announcement that, at some point in the future, the dividend tax rate will 
be increased. There is no immediate effect on either schedule. At time t, 
when the tax increase takes effect, both  schedules  shift  downward as 
shown. With the assumptions already made, a change in the dividend tax 88  Brookings Papers on Economic  Activity,  1:1981 
has no impact on long-run capital intensity. But the change does alter the 
timing of  investment decisions.  Firms have  an  incentive  to  pay  extra 
dividends before the increase in the dividend tax takes effect and to pay 
lower subsequent dividends. Following the announcement, the stock mar- 
ket declines to point A; as firms raise dividends and reduce investment, 
the system moves to B.  At time t, when the dividend tax is increased, the 
economy moves along the stable path from B  to the new equilibrium C. 
Note that the announcement of the tax reduces investment but that invest- 
ment actually rises sharply at the moment the change goes into effect. 
These examples illustrate cases in which tax changes can have opposite 
effects on the stock market and investment and demonstrate the impor- 
tance of taking tax factors into account in estimating relations between 
market valuation and investment. The next section describes the estima- 
tion of investment equations based on q theory. 
Estimating the Relation  between Investment and Q 
In order to use the theoretical framework outlined above to examine 
the response of investment to changes in tax policy, it is first necessary to 
estimate the relation between investment and Q.  This  relation can  be 
interpreted as tracing the economy's adjustment-cost schedule for install- 
ing new investments. As the value of Q rises, firms increase their invest- 
ment until they are just indifferent between installing an extra unit of 
capital and paying out its cost in the form of higher dividends. For sim- 
plicity it is assumed that adjustment is costless until some normal level of 
investment is reached, and then marginal adjustment costs rise linearly 
with investment. As shown in appendix A,  this implies a linear relation 
between the ratio of investment to capital stock and Q. The estimated 
empirical relation between investment and q can be solved to find the 
parameters of the underlying adjustment-cost function. 
The basic equations estimated in this section are of the form 
(13)  K =  y +  ?  Q + u. 
In the explanation of investment an effort is made to contrast the perfor- 
mance of Q with a conventional measure, q, which is not adjusted for 
taxes. Although several authors have estimated variants of equation 13, Lawrence H. Summers  89 
none has taken full account of the tax effects outlined here.20  Typically 
these studies have related components of total business fixed investment 
to q, a procedure that may not be appropriate for noncorporate invest- 
ment. The studies have also been confined to the period after the Korean 
War during which tax changes have been relatively minor. 
To focus  on tax effects, I examine the determinants of  nonfinancial 
corporate investment over the entire 1931-78  period. The extension of 
the sample period introduces substantial variation in tax parameters. The 
dividend tax rate varied between 0.15  and 0.58  during the period; and 
the corporate rate between 0.18  and 0.70.  Extending the equation back 
this far necessitates some crudeness in the calculation of Q and requires 
the use of annual data. Because the emphasis here is on long-run issues, 
this is probably not a serious problem. The calculation of the various com- 
ponents of Q in equation 11 are described in appendix B. 
Estimated values of Q are displayed in table 3, together with estimates 
of conventional q and measures of important tax effects. A striking fea- 
ture of the table is the pronounced drop in q during the past fifty years.21 
The value of q actually peaked in 1937. The tax factors shown in columns 
3 and 5 may account for much of this long-term decline. The discount on 
the price of acquiring new capital goods that results from taxation has 
risen from about 10 percent in the  1930s  to close  to 40 percent in the 
1970s, as shown in column 3. This effect exceeds the offsetting increases 
in the value of future depreciation allowances on existing capital shown 
in column 4. An additional factor that reduced q relative to Q over this 
long period is the increase in the tax cost to individuals of paying out 
dividends rather than retaining earnings, which is reflected in column 5. 
Taxes may also explain why q is lower than theory predicts. Despite 
the fact that many assets of  firms are intangible and are therefore ex- 
cluded from the denominator of the q ratio, it appears that q averages 
less than its theoretical equilibrium value of unity. And in recent years, 
20.  Notable studies include George M. von Furstenberg,  "Corporate  Investment: 
Does Market  Valuation Matter in the Aggregate?"  BPEA, 2:1977, pp. 347-97; John 
H. Ciccolo, Jr., "Four  Essays on Monetary  Policy" (Ph.D. dissertation,  Yale Univer- 
sity, 1975); and Robert F. Engle and Duncan K. Foley, "An Asset Price Model of 
Aggregate  Investment,"  International  Economic  Review,  vol.  16  (October  1975), 
pp. 625-47. 
21.  Another striking  feature of the table is the great volatility of Q relative to q. 
This is not because of variations  in the tax parameters  but arises because V in equa- 
tion 11 is divided by  (1  -  r)  and multiplied  by  (1  -  c)/(1  - a). 90  Brookings Papers on Economic  Activity,  1:1981 
Table 3.  Tax-Adjusted and Unadjusted Measures of q, 1931-78a 
Ratio 
q  Q  ITC +  Z  B/pK  (I-0)7(1-c) 
Year  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5) 
1931  1.541  0.153  0.077  0.054  0.902 
1932  0.942  -0.192  0.085  0.061  0.794 
1933  0.881  -0.387  0.089  0.072  0.789 
1934  1.300  0.025  0.093  0.075  0.780 
1935  1.454  0.110  0.096  0.076  0.772 
1936  1.833  0.547  0.124  0.078  0.772 
1937  2.039  1.017  0.127  0.096  0.782 
1938  1.514  0.362  0.138  0.093  0.819 
1939  1.303  0.657  0.140  0.104  0.806 
1940  1.369  0.721  0.292  0.108  0.781 
1941  1.087  1.081  0.513  0.216  0.721 
1942  0.878  0.431  0.525  0.356  0.650 
1943  0.999  0.535  0.546  0.349  0.640 
1944  1.183  1.748  0.569  0.356  0.536 
1945  1.195  1.225  0.528  0.374  0.576 
1946  1.201  1.422  0.294  0.338  0.581 
1947  0.997  0.768  0.291  0.159  0.567 
1948  0.803  0.433  0.286  0.151  0.598 
1949  0.727  0.164  0.290  0.151  0.615 
1950  0.680  0.021  0.462  0.164  0.587 
1951  0.667  0.287  0.505  0.262  0.588 
1952  0.664  -0.093  0.479  0.282  0.624 
1953  0.666  0.044  0.465  0.272  0.589 
1954  0.725  -0.090  0.409  0.277  0.599 
1955  0.850  0.485  0.415  0.240  0.583 
1956  0.894  0.899  0.415  0.239  0.585 
1957  0.854  0.703  0.405  0.227  0.593 
1958  0.870  0.389  0.410  0.220  0.583 
1959  0.995  0.976  0.398  0.226  0.594 
1960  1.075  1.349  0.399  0.220  0.601 
1961  1.156  1.192  0.402  0.223  0.592 
1962  1.199  1.931  0.427  0.229  0.599 
1963  1.240  1.309  0.438  0.235  0.597 
1964  1.350  1.853  0.424  0.237  0.632 
1965  1.413  2.008  0.413  0.224  0.646 
1966  1.323  2.415  0.395  0.211  0.640 
1967  1.234  1.317  0.389  0.199  0.630 
1968  1.240  1.942  0.422  0.189  0.586 
1969  1.178  2.257  0.377  0.195  0.601 Lawrence H. Summers  91 
Table 3 (continued) 
q  Q  ITC +  Z  B/pK  (1-0)/(1-C) 
Year  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5) 
1970  1.002  1.195  0.330  0.182  0.628 
1971  0.959  0.842  0.360  0.156  0.631 
1972  1.055  0.851  0.375  0.155  0.634 
1973  1.029  1.390  0.374  0.156  0.634 
1974  0.815  0.781  0.359  0.145  0.649 
1975  0.697  -0.135  0.371  0.125  0.619 
1976  0.743  0.342  0.376  0.120  0.606 
1977  0.747  0.641  0.381  0.119  0.606 
1978  0.671  0.216  0.372  0.120  0.606 
Source:  Calculations  by  the  author. 
a.  Variables  are  described  in  the  text. 
although q has remained well below unity, not only gross but also net 
investment has been positive. Contrary to the predictions of the theory, 
the Q variable is greater than its zero investment threshold in almost every 
year.22  It does not show any tendency to remain below  its equilibrium 
value. 
The tax-adjustment terms in columns 3 through 5  are of interest in 
their own right. Column 3 shows that the effect of inflation and the asso- 
ciated rise in nominal interest rates has been a slight rise in the after-tax 
price of new capital goods during the 1970s.  The rise would have been 
larger without the increases in the investment tax credit and the generosity 
of depreciation allowances that have been legislated. 
Column 4 reveals that the entitlement to future depreciation allowances 
on the existing capital stock is an important asset of the nonfinancial cor- 
porate sector. At the end of  1978,  the value of the "depreciation bond" 
was $190  billion, which represented more than a quarter of the market 
value of equity. The combination of accelerating depreciation allowances, 
inflation, and a reduction in statutory corporate rates has led to a large 
decline in the value of this asset from over 20 percent of the capital stock 
in the mid-1960s.  It is reasonable to speculate that the decline in B has 
contributed to the recent sharp fall in q. Evidence bearing on this conjec- 
ture is presented in the simulations below. 
Finally, column 5 examines the evolution  of  the effects of  taxes on 
individuals. After declining between the  1930s and 1940s,  these effects 
22. Note that in a taxless world, Q = q -  1. 92  Brookings Papers on Economic  Activity,  1:1981 
Table 4.  q Investment Equations, 1932-78a 
Independent  variable  Summary  statistic 
Standard 
error  of  Durbin- 
Equationb  Constant  q -  I  Q  Rho  estimate  Watson 
4-1  0.119  -0.038  ...  ...  0.039  0.29 
(0.006)  (0.019) 
4-2  0.096  ...  0.026  ...  0.036  0.21 
(0.008)  (0.007) 
4-3  0.104  0.039  ...  0.944  0.017  1.27 
(0.035)  (0.016) 
4-4  0.096  ...  0.017  0.923  0.016  1.12 
(0.025)  (0.004) 
4-5  0.084  0.013  0.015  0.933  0.016  1.11 
(0.033)  (0.018)  (0.005) 
4-6  0.088  ...  0.031  0.922  0.016  1.11 
(0.024)  (0.005) 
4-7  0.230  -0.106  ...  ...  0.044  0.43 
(0.039)  (0.036) 
4-8  0.076  ...  0.051  ...  0.040  0.34 
(0.012)  (0.013) 
Source: Estimations by the author. 
a.  The dependent variable is I/K.  Equations in  which rho is  omitted were estimated without auto- 
correlation correction. The numbers in parentheses are standard errors. 
b.  For equation 4-6, the coefficient on  Q is the sum of the coefficient on  Q and lagged Q. Equations 
4-7 and 4-8 were estimated using as instruments the lagged values of the tax variables, 0, c, r, Z, and ITC. 
have not changed greatly for many years-the  cost of paying out divi- 
dends has been fairly constant since World War II. But current policy 
proposals for drastic reductions in the tax rates for individuals in top 
brackets could reduce the incentive of firms to retain earnings. 
Tables 4 and 5 present estimates of the simple investment functions 
given in equation 13, using Q and q as alternative explanatory variables. 
Before examining the results, it is necessary to comment on the estima- 
tion. First, the primary goal of this empirical work is to compare the per- 
formance of Q with that of the conventional q variable and to estimate 
parameters of the adjustment-cost function. The  equations are not in- 
tended to provide the best possible explanation of actual investment be- 
havior during the sample period. The  fit of  these equations could  un- 
doubtedly be improved by including other variables to pick up short-run 
influences on investment, but this approach is not pursued here because Lawrence H. Summers  93 
Table 5.  Postwar Q Investment Equations, 1948-78a 
Independent  variable  Summary  statistic 
Standard 
error  of  Durbin- 
Equationb  Constant  q -  I  Q  Rho  estimate  Watson 
5-1  0.138  0.025  ...  ...  0.012  0.92 
(0.002)  (0.009) 
5-2  0.128  ...  0.009  ...  0.011  0.73 
(0.003)  (0.003) 
5-3  0.140  0.034  ...  0.582  0.011  1.88 
(0.004)  (0.019) 
5-4  0.127  ...  0.015  0.763  0.009  1.97 
(0.007)  (0.004) 
5-5  0.135  -0.010  0.016  0.721  0.009  1.94 
(0.021)  (0.026)  (0.004) 
5-6  0.123  ...  0.025  0.894  0.008  1.93 
(0.012)  (0.005) 
5-7  0.098  0.042  ...  ...  0.012  0.77 
(0.014)  (0.015) 
5-8  0.124  ...  0.015  ...  0.011  0.58 
(0.004)  (0.005) 
Source: Estimations by the author. 
a.  The dependent variable is I/K.  Equations in  which rho is  omitted were estimated without auto- 
correlation correction. The numbers in parentheses are standard errors. 
b.  For equation 5-6, the coefficient on  Q is the sum of the coefficient on  Q and lagged Q. Equations 
5-7 and 5-8 were estimated using as instruments the lagged values of the tax variables, 0, c, r,  Z,  and ITC. 
of the focus on long-run issues.23 Second, the appropriate econometric 
procedures are not clearcut in this context, as Engle and Foley emphasize; 
theory suggests that most of the power in the relation between investment 
and q should be found at low frequencies.24  Transforming the data to cor- 
rect for autocorrelation places  greater weight on high frequencies and 
therefore may be inappropriate.25  This point takes on increased impor- 
tance in light of the extreme volatility of the stock market and evidence 
23.  If other variables were added to the equation, the coefficient  on Q could no 
longer be interpreted  as a measure of marginal adjustment  costs. 
24.  Engle and Foley, "Asset  Price Model." 
25.  Robert J. Shiller, "Do Stock Prices Move Too Much To Be Justified  by Sub- 
sequent  Changes in Dividends?"  Working  Paper 456 (National Bureau of Economic 
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that there is substantial "noise" in share price movements.26  Third, there 
are reasons to doubt the exogeneity of the q variables.27  For instance, 
shocks to the adjustment technology may induce spurious correlation be- 
tween q  and investment. These  problems are examined by  estimating 
equation 13 using instrumental variables in some of  the specifications. 
Finally, while not strictly justified by the theory, lagged values of Q are 
included in the investment equations to take account of delivery lags and 
difficulties in the alignment of the investment and Q series. 
The results in table 4 provide evidence that the inclusion of tax effects 
contributes to the explanatory power of the Q theory. Regardless of the 
treatment of autocorrelation, Q has more explanatory power gauged in 
terms of its own statistical significance or regression standard errors than 
does q. When both variables are entered in the same equation, Q is highly 
significant and the coefficient on q is smaller than its standard error. Re- 
estimating the  equations using  instrumental variables provides  strong 
support for the importance of tax effects-Q  is highly significant while q 
has the wrong sign. 
Similar results emerge in table 5. The Q variable continues to outper- 
form q, even though the tax effects vary much less during the postwar 
period. In all cases, the hypothesis that the relation is stable between the 
two parts of the sample cannot be rejected. A variety of other statistical 
tests were performed in an effort to examine the robustness of the results. 
Allowing for second-order serial correlation, deleting the World War II 
and Korean War periods, and varying the instruments used had no impor- 
tant effect on the results. The results are also insensitive to the inclusion 
of more lags or a time trend. 
Changes in tax policy operate both by changing V and through the tax 
adjustment contained in equation 11. It should be stressed that the supe- 
rior performance of Q in explaining investment, which suggests the im- 
portance of tax effects, does not test the importance of the tax effects that 
work through V. The results obtained here only indicate the importance 
of the latter effects. Equation 4-6,  for example, implies that an increase 
26.  This point is amplified in Christopher  A. Sims, "The Role of Approximate 
Prior Restrictions in Distributed Lag Estimations,"  Journal of  the American Sta- 
tistical Association, vol. 67 (March 1972),  pp. 169-75.  It is a variant of the com- 
mon observation that autocorrelation  corrections exacerbate the errors in variables 
problems. 
27.  This point is developed in Thomas J. Sargent, "'Tobin's q' and the Rate of 
Investment in General Equilibrium,"  in Brunner and Metzler, eds., On the State of 
Macro-Economics,  pp.  107-54. Lawrence  H. Summers  95 
of 5 percentage points in the investment tax credit would raise total in- 
vestment by about 3 percent even if it had no impact on market value. As 
shown below, the effect would be much greater if changes in market value 
were added. 
The parameter estimates obtained are consistent with earlier studies. 
Equation 4-6 suggests that d(I/K)  /dQ  approximately equals 0.031;  and 
equation 13 implies dQ/d(V/pK)  approximately equals 3. The implied 
estimate that a 10 percent increase in the value of the stock market raises 
I/K  by about 0.009  is very similar to the estimates found  in previous 
studies.28 
ESTIMATING  THE  IMPACTS  OF  TAX  POLICY 
The theoretical framework outlined above, together with the regres- 
sion results, provides a basis for estimating the impacts of tax reforms on 
investment. In order to do this, it is necessary to provide numerical esti- 
mates of the key parameters relating to the production function, financial 
decisions, and taxes. 
Technological Assumptions.  It is  assumed that production of  gross 
output in the nonfinancial corporate sector is given by a Cobb-Douglas 
production function. The assumption is quite common in the literature on 
investment and is consistent with the constancy of factor shares despite 
the changing ratio of capital to output. The share of capital in the pro- 
duction function is taken to be 0.25.  This is quite close to the observed 
value in the nonfinancial corporate sector. Effective labor supply, which 
is taken to be exogenously determined, is assumed to grow at 3 percent 
a year. Because of the focus on long-run issues, full employment is as- 
sumed. 
The level of investment is assumed to be determined by equation 4-6. 
This equation also yields an estimate of the adjustment-cost function. It 
implies that total adjustment costs, A, are given by 
A  =  16.1 (K-0.088)  K when  K  >  0.088 
A =  0  when I  <  0.088. 
28. See  Ciccolo,  "Four Essays on  Monetary Policy,"  and von  Furstenberg, 
"Corporate  Investment." 96  Brookings Papers on Economic  Activity,  1:1  981 
The simulation results are not sensitive to the choice  of  equation 4-6. 
Similar results are obtained with the other equations in tables 4 and 5. 
The growth of the capital stock is determined by the rate of investment. 
Capital is assumed to depreciate exponentially at 10 percent a year. A 
final technological assumption is that firms maintain a constant ratio of 
inventory to output. This assumption is consistent with the historical con- 
stancy of the inventory-sales ratio; it has no impact on the estimated ef- 
fects  of  tax  reforms, but  has  a  sufficient impact  on  the  estimates  of 
inflation. 
FINANCIAL  POLICY 
A crucial issue in any study of investment behavior is the specification 
of corporate financial policy. The usual procedure is to specify that the 
cost of capital is a weighted average of the cost of debt and equity capital, 
with weights corresponding to the ratio of debt to equity. An analogous 
assumption is made here: firms finance a fraction, b, of net capital invest- 
ment with debt. In addition, in the face of inflation they issue debt so as to 
maintain net indebtedness equal to a fraction, b, of the replacement cost 
of the capital stock. The remainder of investment is financed from re- 
tained earnings. Given the paucity of new equity issues, this assumption 
seems reasonable. 
The choice of b is of little consequence for the estimates of the effects 
of tax reforms. However, because of the deductibility of nominal interest 
payments it has a large effect on estimates of the impact of inflation. The 
simulations reported here all assume that b  equals 0.25.  This figure is 
chosen to understate the adverse impact of inflation on capital formation. 
At book value, the ratio of net financial liabilities to tangible assets in the 
nonfinancial corporate sector was 19.5 percent at the end of  1980.29 At 
market value, the figure  would have been several percentage points lower. 
These debt ratios include any increased leverage that has resulted from 
inflation. 
There is reason to believe that this average debt-capital ratio exceeds 
the  relevant marginal debt-capital  ratio  on  investments  in  plant  and 
equipment. Inventory holdings are heavily financed by bank loans. If it is 
29. These figures  are derived from the Federal Reserve Board's  national balance 
sheets. Similar values can be obtained from von Furstenberg, "Corporate  Invest- 
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assumed that 75 percent of inventory holdings are debt financed, the re- 
maining debt represents only 4 percent of the stock of plant and equip- 
ment. In analyzing the effects of inflation, it is also important to recall 
that much of net nonfinancial corporate debt is concentrated among regu- 
lated utilities, which are hurt because of the use of historical costs in de- 
termining the rate base. For these reasons, it is reasonable to believe that 
the assumptions in  this paper about financial policy  will  yield  lower- 
bound estimates of the impact of inflation.30 
In the simulations reported here it is assumed that real interest rates 
remain constant at 2 percent. The nominal rate rises point for point with 
the rate of inflation. As explained in the last section, this assumption will 
lead to underestimates of the effects of the interactions between inflation 
and taxation. 
The real after-tax required rate of return on equity, p, is taken to be 
0.06.  In all the simulations it is held constant. This value is consistent 
with the stock market's average before-tax real return of 8.5 percent dur- 
ing the 1926-74  period.3' The assumption that tax policy and inflation 
do not affect p is crucial to the analysis. It rules out the possibility that in- 
vestment incentives will be "crowded out" by rising costs of capital. 
Tax Parameters. The tax parameters are chosen to mirror closely the 
current U.S. tax system. The initial values are T  =  0.46,  0 =  0.35,  c  = 
0.05, ITC =  0.056, and  aT  =  0.175, where  aT is the rate  of depreciation 
for tax purposes on the capital stock. One additional complication is in- 
troduced in the simulations: firms are assumed to pay corporate income 
taxes on FIFO inventory profits. The magnitude of this tax as a fraction 
of output is estimated as the product of the corporate tax rate and the 
ratio of the inventory valuation adjustment of the nonfinancial corporate 
sector to its gross output. From this procedure one can conclude that each 
point of inflation raises corporate taxes by 0.17 percent of output. 
With these specifications, the model given by equations 12 and 13 can 
be solved numerically to examine the effects of policy shocks. An algo- 
rithm is used to find the unique self-validating path along which market 
30. Following the previous literature on investment, the effects of  inflation or 
tax reforms  on the ratio of debt to equity are ignored.  The envelope theorem ensures 
that to a first-order  approximation;  this introduces  no error. 
31. Roger G. Ibbotson and Rex A. Sinquefield,  "Stocks,  Bonds, Bills, and Infla- 
tion:  Year-by-Year  Historical  Returns  (1926-1974)."  Journal  of  Business,  vol.  49 
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valuations accurately reflect the present value of  the investments they 
generate.32 
Some properties of the model's steady state in the absence of inflation 
are shown below. 
Steady-state value 
(V/pK)  +b  1.114 
DIV/V  0.048 
Earnings/V  0.09 1 
I/K  0.130 
A/K  0.028 
A/I  0.221 
FK  0.233 
Corporate  taxes/  (FK  -  SR) (K)  0.398 
Total taxes/  (FK-'R  ) (K)  --A  -  (i-7r)  bK  0.562 
The parameters have been chosen to ensure that the steady state affords 
a reasonable benchmark for  studying tax changes.  The  before-tax net 
marginal product of capital is 0.133  when adjustment costs are excluded, 
and 0.104  when they are included. The latter figure corresponds closely 
to historical experience. Adjustment costs are estimated to be 22 percent 
of outlays on investment in the steady state. This estimate is quite sensi- 
tive to  the assumed rates of  growth and depreciation. It is difficult to 
gauge how realistic this assumption is because adjustment costs are not 
directly observable. However,  the simulation results are insensitive  to 
changes in the assumed adjustment-cost function. 
The equilibrium value of Tobin's q is at a benchmark of 1.144, reflect- 
ing the effects of taxes and the marginal adjustment costs associated with 
growth and replacement. The  earnings price ratio and dividend yields 
also correspond well with historical experience. 
Inflation, Corporate Investment, and Market Valuation 
The model of investment and market valuation described in the pre- 
ceding section is now used to evaluate the impact of inflation on the non- 
financial corporate sector. Four separate nonneutralities of the tax system 
32.  Calculation  of the equilibrium  path in a model of this type requires  the solu- 
tion of a two-point boundary-value  problem. This is done using the algorithm de- 
veloped in David Lipton and others, "Multiple Shooting in Rational Expectations 
Models,"  Technical Working  Paper 3 (National Bureau  of Economic Research,  Au- 
gust 1980). Lawrence H. Summers  99 
lead to real effects of inflation.33  First, historical cost depreciation causes 
inflation to raise the effective corporate tax rate. Note that the understate- 
ment of depreciation for tax purposes depends on the entire history of the 
inflation rate, not just on its current level. In 1979, using historical cost 
depreciation rather than replacement cost raised corporate tax liabilities 
by $24.0  billion, or 34.4  percent of actual tax liabilities. Second, firms 
that use FIFO  inventory accounting incur additional tax liabilities  on 
their nominal inventory profits. The size of this effect varies with the in- 
flation rate. In the same year, tax liabilities were increased by $19 billion, 
or 27 percent of actual tax payments because of such inventory profits. 
Third, firms are permitted to  deduct nominal rather than real interest 
payments for tax purposes. In other words, they are not taxed on the capi- 
tal gain that occurs  as inflation erodes  the  value  of  their outstanding 
debt.34  This tends to offset the effects of historical cost depreciation and 
nominal inventory accounting. The  1979 tax savings due to the deduct- 
ibility of nominal interest payments totaled $19.9  billion. Note that the 
effects of  historical  cost  depreciation and FIFO  inventory accounting 
greatly exceed  the value  of  nominal interest deductibility. Fourth,  the 
taxation of nominal rather than real capital gains leads to an increase in 
the before-tax return on equity required by investors. This effect is po- 
tentially quite large. Nominal capital gains on the corporate capital stock 
totaled $178.7  billion in  1979,  implying an extra tax liability of  about 
$10 billion.35 
THE  EFFECTS  OF  INFLATION 
On balance, these effects imply that inflation substantially increases 
the effective tax rate on corporate equity. Martin Feldstein has suggested 
that this could provide an explanation for the observed decline in the 
33. These nonneutralities  are discussed in more detail in Lawrence H. Summers, 
"Inflation and the Valuation of  Corporate Equities," unpublished, August  1980. 
Evidence of their aggregate importance can be found in Feldstein and Summers, 
"Inflation  and the Taxation of Capital Income." 
34. This discussion and calculation ignore the one-time capital gains firms  realize 
on the revaluation of their long-term debt when the inflation rate rises. The effect 
can be  substantial for  some  firms (see  Summers, "Inflation and  Equities"). It 
is not difficult to show that this omission has no influence on the estimates of the 
effect of inflation on investment because the effects on existing debt are inframar- 
ginal. 
35. These capital gains can be masked by  downward recapitalization of  the 
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stock market.36  This  conclusion  has  been  challenged by Hendershott, 
Fama and Gibbons, and Modigliani and Cohn.37  But none of these anal- 
yses takes account of the endogeneity of capital accumulation and its im- 
pact on market valuation; nor do they recognize that taxes complicate the 
determination of the long-run relation between market valuation and the 
replacement cost of the capital stock. Feldstein alone considers the impli- 
cations of his analysis for the long-run growth of the corporate sector, but 
he does not consider the nature of the adjustment path after an inflation 
shock. 
Before turning to the results, one qualification must be reiterated. The 
assumption is maintained throughout that inflation has no impact on the 
real after-tax rate of return required by equity owners. This assumption is 
open to question. Many observers have argued that inflation reduces real 
after-tax interest rates and so should also be assumed to reduce required 
after-tax returns on equity. The results will depend critically on adopting 
the former assumption. This issue is examined in detail in the last section 
of the paper. 
The effect of inflation on market valuation and investment can be esti- 
mated by  simulating the  effects of  an unexpected permanent increase 
from 0 to 8 percent in the rate of inflation. The paths of the variables of 
interest are shown in table 6. All  variables are measured as percentage 
changes from the benchmark steady-state values with no inflation. The 
results indicate that inflation can have a great influence on capital accu- 
mulation in the corporate sector. The immediate effect of an 8 percent 
inflation shock is to reduce the value of the stock market by 15.1 percent. 
This is associated with a 10.2 percent reduction in the rate of investment. 
As the ratio of capital to output subsequently declines, the before-tax 
marginal product of capital rises, and the stock market values tend to rise 
relative to the replacement cost of the capital stock. In the long run, an 
8 percent rate of inflation reduces the capital stock by 28.0  percent and 
36.  Martin Feldstein, "Inflation,  Tax Rules, and the Stock Market,"  Journal of 
Monetary Economics, vol. 6 (July 1980), pp. 309-31. 
37.  Patric H. Hendershott, "The Decline in Aggregate Share Values: Inflation 
and Taxation of the Returns  from Equities and Owner-Occupied  Housing,"  Working 
Paper 370 (National Bureau of Economic Research, July 1979); Eugene F. Fama 
and Michael R. Gibbons, "Inflation,  Real Returns and Capital Investment,"  unpub- 
lished, Graduate  School of Business, University of Chicago, May 1980; and Franco 
Modigliani and Richard A. Cohn, "Inflation,  Rational Valuation, and the Market," 
Financial  Analysts  Journal,  vol.  35  (March-April  1979),  pp. 24-44. Lawrence H. Summers  101 
Table 6.  Response of Stock Market  Valuation and Investment of Nonfinancial 
Corporations to an Increase in Inflation from Zero to Eight Percent 
Percent 
FIFO effects  included  FIFO effects  excluded 
Year  A  ( V/p)  Ai  AK  A(  V/p)  AI  AK 
1  -15.1  -10.2  0.0  -7.5  -5.7  0.0 
2  -16.7  -11.0  -1.3  -8.8  -6.2  -0.7 
3  -17.9  -11.7  -2.6  -9.8  -6.6  -1.4 
4  -18.9  -12.5  -3.7  -10.6  -7.1  -2.1 
5  -19.7  -13.2  -4.9  -11.2  -7.5  -2.7 
10  -22.2  -16.2  -9.7  -13.0  -9.2  -5.5 
15  -23.6  -18.5  -13.5  -13.9  -10.4  -7.6 
20  -24.8  -20.6  -16.5  -14.7  -11.8  -9.4 
50  -27.9  -26.3  -25.2  -16.6  -15.1  -14.5 
Steady state  -29.1  -28.0  -28.0  -17.3  -16.1  -16.1 
Source: Simulations by the author. 
a.  Calculations by the author, as described in the text. All figures refer to percentage changes from the 
benchmark steady state without inflation. 
the value of the stock market by 29.1 percent. Transition is quite slow- 
only three-fourths of the ultimate adjustment of the capital stock takes 
place within twenty years. The effects of inflation on the rate of invest- 
ment actually increase over time, reflecting the reduced need for replace- 
ment investment as the capital stock contracts. 
These findings suggest that inflation accounts for a significant  part of the 
decline in the stock market and the investment that has occurred during 
the past decade. After ten years of 8 percent inflation, the stock market 
value of capital is about 23 percent lower in real terms than it would have 
been in the absence of inflation. The 16.2 percent decline in gross invest- 
ment indicated by the simulations is far larger than what has  actually 
taken place. The relatively strong performance of  investment probably 
reflects the increases in the  1970s  of the investment tax credit and the 
acceleration of tax depreciation as well as some of the other factors such 
as energy discussed at the beginning of  the paper.38 The tax measures 
should have been a significant spur to investment but not to q. 
There are some reasons to believe that the additional taxes incurred as 
a result of FIFO inventory accounting do not discourage investment in 
38. The investment  tax credit was suspended  at the beginning  of the decade and 
applied  at a rate of 9 percent  in 1979. The accelerated  depreciation  rate system intro- 
duced in 1971 has shortened  depreciation  lifetimes by about 20 percent. 102  Brookings Papers on Economic  Activity,  1:1981 
plant and equipment. It is argued that taxes on inventory holdings should 
have no direct impact on the return to plant and equipment investment 
and so should not affect these investment decisions. It has also been ar- 
gued that the taxes are voluntary and so are unlikely to be paid if they im- 
pose a burden. The last three columns of table 6 examine the impact of 
inflation under the assumption that all firms use LIFO (last in, first out) 
accounting and so no taxes are levied on inventory profits. The results in- 
dicate that the impact of inflation is approximately halved if inventory 
effects are excluded. The long run-capital stock is reduced by 16.1 percent 
with no FIFO  effects, compared to 28.0  percent when these effects are 
included. 
It is surely inadvisable to ignore completely the effects of FIFO  on 
corporate tax burdens. The fact that taxes are voluntary does not mean 
that they impose no burden or have no incentive effects. Presumably man- 
agers see some benefit to paying the tax or else  it would  not be paid. 
Increases in the rate of inflation erode the surplus the firm receives by 
using FIFO and so impose a burden. The practice of looking at actual firm 
behavior rather than the tax situation of a hypothetical tax-minimizing 
firm is well established in the literature on investment. The usual practice 
is to assume that firms only slowly learn to take advantage of accelerated 
depreciation. The "involuntary  taxes" firms pay as they learn are assumed 
to have real effects on investment. The  argument that inventory taxes 
affect only  inventory investment and not  fixed investment is  not  per- 
suasive. Firms undertake fixed investment in order to expand their ca- 
pacity to produce output. Any reasonable specification of production and 
sales technology will imply that increases in output lead to greater inven- 
tory holding. Taxes on inventories may thus discourage capacity-creating 
investment. The particular technological assumption made here that the 
inventory-output ratio is constant may not be exactly accurate. However, 
there is no evidence that the elasticity of substitution between inventories 
and capital is very large. As long as this is the case, the assumption of a 
constant ratio will be approximately correct. The only available empirical 
evidence provides further support for the assumption that inventory taxes 
discourage capital accumulation.39 
39.  Robert McDonald shows that investment in industries with high FIFO in- 
ventories investment  is discouraged  by inflation  relative to investment  in other indus- 
tries. See his "Inflation  and the Industrial  Composition  of Investment,"  unpublished, 
Massachusetts  Institute of Technology, 1981. Lawrence H. Summers  103 
These considerations suggest that the estimates of the impact of infla- 
tion in the first three columns of table 6 are the most plausible. This con- 
clusion is reinforced by recalling that the financial policy parameters were 
set to understate the estimated effects of inflation. 
The results in table 6 indicate that inflation may have a great impact 
on capital accumulation. An increase in the rate of inflation from 0 to 8 
percent slows the rate of growth of the capital stock by about 1 percent a 
year for the first decade. This should be expected to reduce the rate of 
growth of productivity and real wages by 0.25 percent each year. Accord- 
ing to these calculations, in the long run inflation reduces the level  of 
both output and wages in the corporate sector by about 6 percent from the 
levels that would have been reached in the absence of inflation. 
It is frequently proposed that the nonneutralities of the tax system that 
produce these effects can be remedied through indexation. The effects of 
inflation on the stock market and investment under various partial in- 
dexing schemes are shown in table 7. The table also makes it possible to 
examine the relative importance of the various distortions associated with 
inflation. Full indexing, which makes the tax system completely neutral to 
inflation, is not shown in the table. 
Indexing depreciation allowances and the cost of goods  sold for the 
purpose of calculating inventory profits while not recognizing for tax pur- 
poses the profits firms realize on their outstanding debt would result in 
inflation significantly encouraging rather than discouraging investment. 
With such indexing, an 8 percent increase in the expected rate of inflation 
would raise the stock market by about 8 percent in the short run. This is 
because the advantage from the deduction of nominal interest payments 
is greater than the burden arising from the taxation of inflation-induced 
capital gains. The results in table 7 imply that indexing depreciation al- 
lowances would reduce the equilibrium ratio of the stock market value to 
the replacement cost of the capital stock because such indexation reduces 
the effective price of new capital goods. 
The effects of inflation with full indexing at the corporate level  are 
shown in the third and fourth columns of table 7. The remaining distor- 
tion, taxation of nominal capital gains, leads to a reduction in stock mar- 
ket values and capital formation. The  capital gains distortion alone  is 
sufficient to cause 8 percent inflation to reduce the steady-state capital 
stock by approximately 10 percent. 
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Table 7.  Effects of Eight Percent Inflation with Indexation on the Stock Market 
Value and Investment of Nonfinancial Corporationsa 
Percent 
Indexed depreciation  Full corporate  Indexed capital 
and inventoryb  indexinge  gainsd 
Year  A  V  Ai  A  V  Ai  A  V  A-I 
1  6.3  9.6  -5.3  -3.2  -10.5  -7.5 
2  6.9  9.6  -5.5  -3.4  -12.0  -8.1 
3  7.5  10.9  -5.7  -3.7  -13.1  -8.7 
4  8.1  11.9  -5.9  -3.9  -14.0  -9.3 
5  8.6  12.8  -6.1  -4.2  -14.7  -9.8 
10  10.8  18.7  -6.8  -5.2  -16.8  -12.1 
15  12.6  20.7  -7.3  -6.0  -18.0  -13.8 
20  13.8  22.6  -7.7  -4.3  -18.9  -15.5 
50  17.8  26.1  -9.7  -9.3  -21.7  -20.1 
Steady state  19.1  27.3  -11.1  -10.6  -23.2  -21.3 
Source: Simulations by the author. 
a.  All numbers shown are percentage changes from the benchmark steady state without inflation. 
b,  It is assumed that replacement cost depreciation is allowed on existing assets and new investments. 
c.  It is assumed that firms are permitted to deduct only real interest payments for tax purposes in addi- 
tion to the indexing described in note b. 
d.  Only real capital gains are taxed. The simulation in these two columns assumes no indexation at 
the corporate level. 
sidered in the last two columns in the table. The results show that cor- 
porate tax nonneutralities are responsible for a large fraction of inflation's 
impact on capital formation. They clearly indicate that, contrary to asser- 
tions made by some authors, the effects of inflation on inventory profits 
and depreciation allowances more than offset the deductibility of nominal 
interest payments. This is because the analysis takes explicit account of 
the cumulative understatement of  depreciation allowances that accom- 
panies inflation in the steady state. 
TAX  REFORM  AND  CORPORATE  INVESTMENT 
Measures to spur investment through tax reduction command wide- 
spread support. Little is known, however, about the relative effectiveness 
of alternative policies. Investment incentives can be roughly divided into 
three categories-reductions  in the effective price of new capital goods 
through the investment tax credit or accelerated depreciation, reductions 
in the corporate tax rate, and reductions in taxes on the return to invest- 
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Much  of  the discussion of  corporate tax reform has focused  on  its 
likely impact on investment; but issues of horizontal and vertical equity 
should also be considered. Although unsophisticated observers focus on 
the distinction between  tax relief for  business and for  individuals, all 
taxes are ultimately borne by individuals in their role as labor suppliers, 
consumers, or suppliers of capital. The corporation tax should be thought 
of as one portion of the tax on capital; and for the study of equity as well 
as incentives, it should be integrated with the personal tax. The change in 
the value of the stock market immediately following a tax change pro- 
vides a direct measure of the present value of the tax change to the sup- 
pliers of equity capital, taking both the corporate and personal taxes into 
account. The change in market value thus seems a natural candidate for 
measuring the incidence of capital tax reform. Good tax reform should 
minimize windfall gains and losses. 
The influence of tax policy on the stock market has important conse- 
quences for vertical equity. Most  corporate equity is owned directly or 
indirectly by the wealthy. About 75 percent is held directly by individuals, 
and about half of this is held by families with incomes in the top 1 percent 
of the income distribution.40  This presumably understates the true con- 
centration because much of the remainder of this 75 percent is held by 
individuals with deceptively low reported incomes due to tax shelters or 
temporarily low income. The remaining stock is mostly held by pension 
funds, foreigners, and insurance companies. Because almost all pension 
plans offer defined benefits, the pension's assets are ultimately owned not 
by the beneficiaries but by the share owners in the corporations with pen- 
sion liabilities. Hence this stock is also primarily owned by the affluent. 
The distributional consequences  of  ownership by insurance companies 
and foreigners are less clear. But the conclusion seems inevitable-a  tax- 
induced change in profitability that shows up in the stock market falls 
almost entirely on the rich. If the tax stimulation of  investment is the 
primary social  objective,  not  redistribution to  the  rich, tax  incentives 
should minimize the windfall gains to existing shareholders. 
An increase in the investment tax credit is examined in table 8. Results 
for accelerated depreciation would be analytically similar. The first three 
columns of the table consider the effects of an immediate doubling of the 
40. These figures  are all based on information  or dividend income derived from 
the TAXSIM file of the National Bureau of Economic Research with the assistance 
of Daniel Feenberg. 106  Brookings Papers on Economic  Activity,  1:1981 
Table 8.  Comparison of an Immediate and an Anticipated Increase in the Investment 
Tax Credita 
Percent 
Immediate  Anticipated 
Year  A(V/p)  Ai  AK  A(V/p)  Ai  AK 
1  4.8  5.5  0.0  3.8  0.3  0.0 
2  5.2  6.0  0.7  4.3  2.8  0.3 
3  5.5  6.5  1.4  4.8  3.2  0.6 
4  5.9  6.9  2.0  5.3  6.2  0.9 
5  6.2  7.4  2.6  5.6  6.6  1.6 
10  6.2  9.4  5.4  7.0  8.8  4.5 
15  8.4  11.2  7.7  8.1  10.7  7.0 
20  9.1  12.2  9.4  8.9  11.8  8.9 
50  11.5  16.2  15.3  11.4  16.1  15.1 
Steady state  12.4  17.3  17.3  12.4  17.3  17.3 
Source: Simulations by the author. 
a.  In both simulations the investment tax credit is doubled, with its effective rate rising from 0.056 to 
0.112. The anticipated change takes place four years after announcement. The numbers in the table are 
percentage  deviations from steady state with 8 percent  inflation. 
investment tax credit from 0.056  to 0.112.  The results indicate that the 
credit has important effects on investment and a considerable effect on 
market value-approximately  ten  times the  one-year tax  expenditure. 
The first year effect of  doubling the credit is to raise the stock market 
value by 4.8  percent and the level of investment by 5.5  percent. Even 
though this is a substantial windfall to existing stockholders, it is small 
compared to the windfall effects of other tax incentives. Because increases 
in the credit apply only to new investment, they provide more stimulus to 
investment per dollar of forgone revenue than tax changes that apply to 
old as well as new capital. The same can be said about accelerated de- 
preciation. In the long run the capital stock is increased by 17.3 percent. 
These estimates are fairly close to those obtained by others using conven- 
tional investment equations; however,  the  results obtained here imply 
that the process of adjustment is much slower than is usually assumed. 
The half-life of the adjustment process is close to twenty years. 
The last three columns of the table consider the effect of the announce- 
ment of a future investment tax credit. Paradoxically, an announcement 
of a future tax credit increases investment even before the credit takes 
effect. The  announcement that the credit will  double  in  four years is 
estimated to raise the market value by 3.8 percent in the first year, and 
to increase investment by 2.8  percent in the second year. It might have 
been expected that investment would decline before the credit went into Lawrence H. Summers  107 
Table 9. Comparison of an Immediate and an Anticipated Reduction of the Corporate 
Tax Ratea 
Percent 
Immediate  Anticipated 
Year  A(V/p)  Ai  AK  A(V/p)  Ai  AK 
1  13.3  3.2  0.0  10.5  6.0  0.0 
2  13.5  3.4  0.4  11.8  6.9  0.8 
3  13.7  3.7  0.8  13.1  7.8  1.5 
4  13.8  3.9  1.1  14.5  4.7  2.3 
5  14.0  4.2  1.4  14.6  4.9  2.6 
10  14.7  5.2  2.4  15.1  5.9  3.9 
15  15.3  6.2  4.2  15.6  6.8  5.0 
20  15.7  6.7  5.1  15.9  7.1  5.7 
50  16.9  8.7  8.1  17.0  8.8  8.2 
Steady state  17.4  9.0  9.0  17.4  9.0  9.0 
Source: Simulations by the author. 
a.  In both simulations the corporate tax rate is reduced from 0.46 to 0.40. The anticipated change takes 
place four years after announcement. The numbers in the table are percentage deviations from steady 
state with 8 percent inflation. 
effect and would jump immediately afterward. While there is incentive to 
postpone investment to take advantage of the tax credit, the desire for 
higher future investment itself makes current investment more attractive. 
Current  investment not only increases output, but also reduces the adjust- 
ment costs associated with the higher future investment because it makes 
the future capital stock larger. If marginal adjustment costs were lower, 
this effect would not predominate. 
The effects of  reductions in the corporate tax rate are examined in 
table 9. An immediate rate reduction from 0.46 to 0.40 is contrasted with 
an announcement that in the fourth year such a tax cut will take place. 
The measures are equivalent in the long run and both raise the steady- 
state capital stock by 9 percent. They increase the long-run value of the 
stock market by almost twice as much as this increase in the capital stock. 
This is because the reduced corporate tax lowers the value of accelerated 
depreciation and the immediate expensing of adjustment costs,  thereby 
raising the after-tax cost of new capital goods. 
The simulations show that the announcement of a future cut has a sig- 
nificantly greater short-run impact on investment than immediate imple- 
mentation of the cut. The former raises the capital stock by 2.3 percent 
after four years; the latter, by only 1.1 percent, even though immediate 
implementation has a greater initial impact on market value. Again, this 
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justment costs. Firms find it optimal to accelerate their investment plans 
to take account of the lower effective price of  capital goods-resulting 
from larger tax savings on costs and depreciation-that  prevails before 
the tax reduction actually takes place. This implies that if the goal of the 
corporate tax rate reduction is to increase capital formation, the measure 
should be announced well in advance of the enactment. Similar considera- 
tions suggest the possibility that a temporary increase in the corporate 
tax rate would actually spur investment by encouraging firms to incur the 
associated tax-deductible costs while rates are high. 
These findings have important policy implications. They indicate that 
a policy  of  announcing a future reduction in corporate taxes will spur 
investment with no current revenue loss. Indeed, the effect on investment 
would actually be enhanced if corporate taxes were raised immediately 
and then cut. By combining temporary corporate tax rate increases with 
temporary increases in the investment tax credit or accelerated deprecia- 
tion, investment stimulus could be provided at no short-run budgetary 
cost. 
Corporate tax rate changes have large windfall effects on  the stock 
market, however, because they affect the inframarginal  return on existing 
capital as well as the incentive to acquire new capital goods. In the short 
run, changes in the corporate tax have three to four times the effect on 
market value as does a tax credit with the same effect on investment; in the 
long run, the ratio of the stock market effects is almost two to one. This 
may explain why the business community is typically so eager for a re- 
duction in the corporate tax rate, even though it is not a strong investment 
stimulus. 
Most  previous analyses of  investment incentives have neglected  the 
role of individual taxes. The effects of two reforms in the individual tax 
system are considered in table 10. Eliminating capital gains taxes would 
raise the stock market value by 4.4 percent in the short run. Because it 
would increase the advantages to the firm of retaining earnings, the im- 
pact on investment is large, and the investment stimulus is larger relative 
to the increase in V than it is for any other stimulus considered. In the 
long run, it would raise the capital stock by 17.7 percent and the market 
value by only two-thirds as much. The transition, like the adjustment path 
following any tax change in the model, is gradual, with only half the ad- 
justment occurring within the first decade. 
The second reform considered in the table is an announcement that Lawrence H. Summers  109 
Table 10. Reforms in Individual Taxes 
Percent 
Elimination  of the capital  Anticipated  elimination  of the 
gains tax  dividend  tax 
Year  A(V/p)  Ai  AK  A(V/p)  Ai  AK 
1  4.4  6.0  0.0  42.6  24.6  0.0 
2  4.8  6.5  0.7  48.4  29.1  3.2 
3  5.2  7.0  1.5  54.5  33.9  6.5 
4  5.5  7.4  2.1  61.1  6.4  10.0 
5  5.8  7.9  2.8  60.5  6.6  9.6 
10  7.1  10.0  5.7  58.5  5.4  7.7 
15  8.2  11.8  8.2  57.6  4.6  6.2 
20  8.8  12.8  10.0  56.7  3.5  4.4 
50  11.1  16.8  15.8  54.6  1.1  1.4 
Steady state  11.9  17.7  17.7  53.8  0.0  0.0 
Source: Simulations by the author. 
a.  The numbers in the table are percentage changes relative to steady state with 8 percent inflation. 
Dividend taxes are eliminated four years after announcement. 
the dividend tax will be eliminated after four years. As explained above, 
changes in the dividend tax rate have no effect on a steady-state capital 
intensity. The announcement that a dividend tax reduction will occur, 
however, gives firms a strong incentive to defer paying dividends. In the 
model, this is done by accelerating investment. In the simulation the an- 
nouncement effect raises investment by 24.6  percent and stock market 
value by 42.6 percent in the first year. Only a stock market effect remains 
in the long run. 
One clear lesson to be derived from the theory developed in this paper 
is that dividend relief is a very poor form of investment incentive. In the 
long run, dividend taxes are neutral unless firms issue new equity, which 
is relatively unimportant in practice. Thus, reducing the dividend tax has 
small incentive effects and serves primarily to provide a windfall to the 
owners of corporate capital.41 A natural corollary is that reducing the tax 
rates of the individuals in high tax brackets is likely to have more effect 
on market values than on investment. 
Taken together, the results indicate the large scope  available to  tax 
policy for affecting capital accumulation in the long run. Politically con- 
41. These arguments  were first  put forth by Alan J. Auerbach in his "Share  Val- 
uation and Corporate Equity Policy," Journal of Public Economics, vol. 11 (June 
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Table 11.  Comparison of a Permanent and a Temporary Reduction in the Investors' 
Required Rate of Returna 
Percent 
Permanent reductioni  Temporary reductionb 
Year  A( V/p)  AI  AK  A( V/p)  Ai  AK 
1  14.7  8.4  0.0  2.7  1.5  0.0 
2  15.3  9.2  1.1  2.0  1.2  0.2 
3  15.9  10.0  2.2  1.1  0.7  0.4 
4  16.5  10.7  3.2  0.2  0.1  0.4 
5  17.0  11.4  4.2  0.2  0.1  0.4 
10  19.1  14.5  8.6  0.1  0.1  0.3 
15  20.8  17.2  12.3  0.1  0.1  0.3 
20  21.9  19.0  15.1  0.1  0.0  0.2 
50  25.7  25.1  24.2  0.0  0.0  0.0 
Steady state  27.1  27.2  27.2  0.0  0.0  0.0 
Source: Simulations by the author. 
a.  In each case the change from a reduction in p from 0.06 to 0.05 is reported. The numbers in the table 
indicate the percentage changes from steady state with 8 percent inflation. 
b. The rate of return is reduced for only three years. Investors know that the reduction is transitory. 
ceivable  measures,  such  as  the  removal  of  capital  gains  taxes  or  the 
allowance of more rapid or indexed depreciation, would have a great im- 
pact on long-run capital intensity. Measures can be designed to stimulate 
investment with  a relatively low  cost  in forgone  government revenue. 
These simulations also highlight the dangers of indiscriminate tax cutting. 
The incentive effects of announced and unannounced cuts vary greatly 
among tax measures; thus careful policy design can increase the invest- 
ment stimulus per dollar of lost government revenue. 
Taxation and the Required Rate of Return 
The analysis thus far has assumed that neither taxes nor inflation affect 
the real after-tax rate of  return required by investors in the corporate 
sector. Similar assumptions are common in partial equilibrium analyses 
of the effects of  tax changes on the level  of  investment. However,  the 
treatment of the required rate of return is crucial to any estimate of tax 
effects on investment. An  endogenous response of the required rate to 
changes in taxes or to induced changes in the market value of capital and 
wealth could in principle significantly alter the results. Table 11 indicates Lawrence  H. Summers  111 
that permanent and temporary changes in the rate of return required by 
corporate investors have substantial effects. A permanent reduction in the 
real after-tax required rate of return from 0.06 to 0.05 would immediately 
raise stock market value by 14.7 percent and the level of investment by 
8.4 percent. This effect is large; it approaches the negative impact of an 
8 percent increase in the rate of inflation. Thus neglecting any effects of 
tax policy on the required rate of return is likely to lead to  significant 
overestimates of policy impacts. 
The last three columns of the table shed light on a controversy that has 
received a great deal of  attention. Comparing them with the first three 
columns shows the different effects of changes in the short- and long-term 
required rate of return. In the presence of adjustment costs, investment 
is far more sensitive to the long-term than the short-term rate. This has 
important implications for the transmission mechanism of general mone- 
tary and fiscal policies and underscores the fact that the crucial question 
is the impact of  tax measures on investors' long-term required rate of 
return, not on their required rate of return over a short horizon. 
INVESTMENT  AND  THE  SUPPLY  OF  FUNDS 
TO  THE  CORPORATE  SECTOR 
In analyzing the impact of tax changes and inflation on required rates 
of return, I adopt a variant of the framework that Martin Feldstein and I 
developed in earlier research.42  As figure 6 illustrates, the required after- 
tax rate of return, p, depends on the supply and demand for corporate 
capital. The KD schedule in the figure demonstrates that, in the long run, 
firms will demand more capital as the required rate of return declines. 
The simulations reported in table 11 show that the KD schedule is very 
flat, and that a reduction in p of 1 percentage point increases K by 27 per- 
cent. The KS schedule indicates that the supply of capital to the corporate 
sector depends positively on the real after-tax return received by inves- 
tors. The  assumption maintained thus  far-that  the  after-tax rate  of 
return required by corporate investors is constant-is  equivalent to  as- 
suming that the KS curve in figure 6 is horizontal. That is, it requires that 
42.  Martin  Feldstein and Lawrence  Summers,  "Inflation,  Tax Rules and the Long- 
Term Interest  Rate,"  BPEA, 1:1978, pp. 61-109. 112  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity,  1:1 981 





the supply of funds to the corporate sector is perfectly elastic.43  Unless 
this condition is satisfied, investment incentives will be partially crowded 
out by increases in the rate of return required by corporate investors. In 
the limiting case in which the supply of funds to the corporate sector is 
completely inelastic and the KS  curve in figure 6 is vertical, investment 
stimuli will have no effect on capital accumulation. 
It is therefore crucial to assess the elasticity of the supply of funds to 
the corporate sector. This elasticity should not be confused with the elas- 
ticity of total saving with respect to the rate of  return; analysis of  the 
problem in these terms ignores portfolio reallocations. Even if the supply 
of total saving were completely insensitive to rates of return, the supply 
of funds to the corporate sector might be highly elastic in response to 
changes in the relative rates of  return on  corporate and noncorporate 
capital. The crucial issue here is the size of the corporate sector relative 
to the entire capital market. If the corporate sector is small relative to the 
capital market, the assumption that it faces an exogenously determined 
rate of return is quite reasonable. 
43.  An alternative  assumption  is that the supply of funds to the corporate sector 
is not perfectly elastic but is shifted outward by tax reforms. This possibility is ana- 
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The national balance sheets prepared by the Federal Reserve Board 
reveal that the nonfinancial corporate sector accounts for a surprisingly 
small fraction of  net wealth. At the end of  1980,  the market value of 
equity in this sector was $1,246.9  billion. This represented only  13 per- 
cent of the net worth of all domestic holders of wealth. To some extent 
this low figure reflects the depressed value of the stock market and ignores 
corporate debt. At replacement cost, the value of the tangible assets in 
the corporate sector was $2,190.8  billion, or 23 percent of domestic net 
worth. These figures suggest that the corporate sector plays a relatively 
small role in the domestic capital market because a sizable fraction of the 
national wealth is held in the form of housing and noncorporate capital.44 
The U.S. corporate sector appears even less dominant in the context of 
world capital markets. U.S.  funds flow out of the country, and foreign 
funds flow in, in response to changes in the attractiveness of investment in 
the United States.45  The potential importance of these flows is indicated 
by the 25 percent of net investment by U.S. corporations that takes place 
abroad.46  Because the U.S. corporate sector represents only a small frac- 
tion of the total demands on the world capital markets, it seems reason- 
able to adopt the competitive assumption that the supply of funds to the 
corporate sector is highly elastic. 
Several objections might be made to  the  analysis of  this supply of 
funds. Some of the tax changes that have been considered would affect 
investments outside the corporate sector. Hence, focusing only on the size 
of this sector would lead to an underestimate of its effects throughout the 
economy. However, the total of all plant and equipment valued at replace- 
ment cost accounts for less than one-third of total U.S. net worth, and a 
much smaller fraction of world net worth. Even if some other assets were 
affected in parallel with corporate assets, the total would not be large rela- 
tive to total net worth. It might also be argued that markets are segmented, 
or that corporate capital is an imperfect substitute for other assets, so it is 
44.  In a recent work I  illustrate how portfolio reallocations between owner- 
occupied housing and corporate  stock induced by tax effects help to account for the 
boom in housing prices and stock market slump that occurred  during the 1970s. See 
Lawrence  H. Summers  "Inflation,  the Stock Market and Owner Occupied  Housing," 
American  Economic  Review,  vol.  71  (May  1981),  Papers  and Proceedings,  1980), 
pp. 429-34. 
45.  For example,  see the paper by Jeffrey  Sachs in this issue. 
46.  This figure appears in C. Fred Bergsten, Thomas Horst, and Theodore H. 
Moran,  American  Multinationals  and  American  Interests  (Brookings  Institution, 
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not reasonable to look at the corporate sector relative to the entire capital 
market. Segmentation seems untenable in light of the data on the distribu- 
tion of corporate stock discussed above. Most stock is held by wealthy 
individuals who hold a variety of other assets in their portfolios. Although 
imperfect substitutability  is a theoretical possibility, empirical studies ap- 
pear to show that portfolio allocations are sensitive to tax considerations.47 
The analysis thus far has assumed that the total supply of savings is 
insensitive to the rate of return. Even if portfolio allocations were com- 
pletely inflexible, the supply of funds to the corporate sector would be 
highly elastic if overall saving were sufficiently sensitive to interest rates. 
Some recent theoretical arguments have suggested it may be, challenging 
the widespread belief that the saving rate is interest-inelastic. The "infinite 
horizon" model of intertemporal consumption decisions implies that sav- 
ing is infinitely elastic in the long run.48  Elsewhere I have argued that 
plausible life-cycle formulations imply a very high interest elasticity of 
saving.49  Whatever the theoretical rationale for a high interest elasticity 
of saving, the available empirical evidence is weak and inconclusive.50 
If either portfolio allocations or total saving is responsive to rates of 
return, the supply of funds to the corporate sector is likely to be highly 
elastic. The implications for policy directed at stimulating investment in 
47.  See, for example, Martin Feldstein, "Personal  Taxation and Portfolio Com- 
position: An Econometric  Analysis,"  Econometrica,  vol. 44 (July 1976), pp. 631-50. 
48.  Recent empirical research suggests that this model may be appropriate  be- 
cause bequests motivate a large fraction of capital accumulation.  See, for example, 
Laurence Kotlikoff and Lawrence H. Summers, "The Importance of  Intergenera- 
tional Transfers in Aggregate Capital Accumulation," forthcoming in Journal of 
Political  Economy,  August  1981. 
49.  Lawrence  H. Summers,  "Taxation  and Capital Accumulation in a Life Cycle 
Growth Model," forthcoming in American Economic Review, September 1981. The 
result occurs because of the important  effect of changes in the rate of return  on the 
discounted  value of future  labor income. This conclusion echoes earlier  work. Calcu- 
lations reported by James Tobin suggest a large long-run response of saving to in- 
terest rates. See his "Life Cycle Saving and Balanced Growth," in William Fellner 
and  others,  Ten  Economic  Studies  in  the  Tradition  of  Irving  Fisher  (John  Wiley, 
1967), pp. 231-56. 
50.  Michael Boskin, in the first study to use a measure of the real after-tax in- 
terest rate as an explanatory  variable, found an interest elasticity of saving of about 
0.4. While his estimate has been widely challenged as too high, there are reasons 
to believe that a study of its type may underestimate  the actual response to a per- 
manent change in tax policy: his data come from transitory variations in interest 
rates, and he takes no account of possible wealth effects arising from changes in 
interest rates. See Michael J. Boskin, "Taxation,  Saving, and the Rate of Interest," 
Journal of Political  Economy,  vol.  86 (April  1978),  pt. 2, pp. S3-S27. Lawrence H. Summers  115 
plant and equipment are clear-measures  to  encourage these forms of 
investment are likely to be much more effective than those  directed at 
increasing saving in general. The high elasticity of supply of funds to the 
corporate sector suggests that only a small fraction of any policy-induced 
increase in saving will find its way into corporate investment, and that 
reduced government deficits, or tax incentives directed at individual sav- 
ers, will not greatly affect corporate capital formation. The analysis also 
implies that measures directed specifically at investment in  plant  and 
equipment will be successful because any crowding out due to inelasticity 
in the supply of funds is likely to be minor. 
Even if the supply of funds to the corporate sector is not highly elastic, 
policy could shift the supply curve outward. Most forms of tax relief for 
corporate capital would do this, since a significant fraction of such relief 
probably would be retained by corporations. Empirical evidence suggests 
that individuals do not fully pierce the corporate veil, so that their per- 
sonal saving does not offset changes in retained earnings by corporations. 
Furthermore, because most corporate equity is held by the wealthy or by 
institutions with a very low marginal propensity to consume, a large frac- 
tion of any increase in dividends is likely to be saved. Because of these 
effects, tax incentives to business could actually reduce the required rate 
of return, depending on how they were financed.5' 
Finally, the government has independent monetary and fiscal policies 
with which it can manipulate the required rate of return. If crowding out 
of investment incentives due to a limited supply of savings became a prob- 
lem, the government could easily reduce the required rate of return with 
easy money and tight fiscal policies. The question of crowding out is in a 
sense academic because policy can overcome any tendency in this direc- 
tion.  This point  has long  been  recognized in  connection  with debates 
about the effectiveness of fiscal policy in raising appropriate demand. 
Strong reasons exist to support the assumption made here that tax poli- 
cies have little impact on the required rate of return. However, the ques- 
tion is ultimately an empirical one. In a previous work Martin Feldstein 
and I attempted to gauge the elasticity of the supply of capital to the cor- 
porate sector by examining the effects on actual interest rates of changes 
in the maximum potential interest rate that firms can afford to pay on a 
51. If, for example, tax incentives were financed  with cuts in government  spend- 
ing or taxes on groups with a high marginal propensity to consume, they would re- 
duce consumption  demand tending  to depress  the required  rate of return. 116  Brookings Papers on Economic  Activity,  1:1 981 
given investment project.52  The results indicate that each  1 percentage 
point increase in this maximum affordable rate raises interest rates by 
only 25 basis points, which suggests a high elasticity of  supply. It also 
implies, roughly, that only 25 percent of the stimulus afforded by invest- 
ment tax incentives is offset by rising required rates of return. 
INFLATION  AND  REQUIRED  RATES  OF  RETURN 
If the supply of funds to the corporate sector is highly elastic, changes 
in the rate of inflation should have little impact on the real rate of return 
required by corporate investors. This assumption underlies the simula- 
tions in table 6 showing that increases in the rate of inflation greatly re- 
duce the value of  the stock market and the level  of  corporate capital 
accumulation. A quite different treatment of the required rate of return 
has been employed in most previous discussions of  inflation-tax inter- 
actions.53  These discussions postulate that a fixed risk premium separates 
the after-tax returns on stocks and bonds. Because interest rates appear 
to rise no more than point for point with inflation, real after-tax bond 
yields fall. And because a fixed spread between bond and stock returns 
is assumed, a decline in the required rate of return on equity is also im- 
plied, and it is frequently quite large. If a 25 percent tax rate on interest 
income is assumed, 8 percent inflation reduces real after-tax bond yields 
by 2 percentage points. After allowing for such declines in the rate of 
return, Hendershott and Gordon argue that inflation is not likely to have 
an adverse impact on the stock market or capital accumulation. My simu- 
lations of changes in the rate of inflation and the required rate of return 
support their conclusion that a 2 percent reduction in the real rate would 
offset the other adverse effects of inflation. 
The crucial issue, then, is the validity of inferring the required rate of 
return on equity by adding a constant risk premium to the real after-tax 
return on  bonds.  This  procedure is  not  well  suited to  examining the 
effects of inflation-taxation interactions. Elsewhere I have argued that, in 
any realistic model in which tax effects are the principal source of non- 
52. Feldstein and Summers, "Inflation,  Tax Rules, and the Long-Term Interest 
Rate." 
53. See, for example, Martin  Feldstein, "Inflation,  Tax Rules, and the Stock Mar- 
ket,"9  Journal of Monetary Economics, vol. 6 (July 1980), pp. 309-3 1; Hendershott, 
"The Decline in Aggregate Share Values," and Roger Gordon, "Inflation  Taxation 
and Corporate Behavior,"  Working Paper 588 (National Bureau of Economic Re- 
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neutrality, interest rates should rise much more than point for point with 
the rate of inflation.54  The failure of interest rates to respond in this way 
to inflation historically suggests that other nontax factors have been in 
operation. If the goal is to examine the interactions between inflation and 
taxes, these factors should be excluded from consideration and a greater 
than point-for-point adjustment of interest rates to inflation should be 
assumed. If this were done, inflation would have a larger negative impact 
on capital formation than is suggested by the simulations above.55 
Alternatively, if the goal is to explain the historical experience, one 
must consider the possibility that the nontax factors affecting the relation 
between interest rates and inflation also influence the relation between 
inflation and the required return on equity. Throughout the post-World 
War II period, increases in inflation have been associated with increased 
variance in real economic performance and volatility in stock prices. Al- 
though there is no evidence of causality in this correlation, a positive cor- 
relation between inflation and the equity risk premium is also likely. This 
would account for the decline in real after-tax bond yields, but would 
imply that the inflation has been associated with increases  in the required 
return on equity. This prediction is borne out by the high ratios of earn- 
ings to prices that have prevailed throughout the  1970s.  The  apparent 
increases in risk premiums may also be the result of inflation illusion- 
investors  equate  required real  returns on  equity  with  nominal  bond 
yields.56 
The argument presented above, that inflation has not depressed the 
required return on equity, is supported by the recent analysis of Brainard, 
Shoven, and Weiss.57  The internal rate-of-return series that they calculate 
can be interpreted as estimates of the rate of return required by corporate 
investors. While their series excludes individual tax effects and includes 
54. This discussion draws on Lawrence H. Summers, "The Non-Adjustment  of 
Nominal Interest Rates: A Study of  the Fisher Effect," National Bureau of Eco- 
nomic Research, Conference Paper, forthcoming. 
55. This is because the net gains firms realize due to the combination of higher 
interest  rates, nominal interest  deductibility,  and capital gains on debt would be less 
than those in the simulations reported here. 
56. For a forceful argument that this has in fact occurred, see Modigliani and 
Cohn, "Inflation and Rational Market Valuation." A  major difficulty with  the 
Modigliani-Cohn  view is that a similar inflation  illusion has not plagued the housing 
market.  This is surprising  because participants  are financially less sophisticated and 
more constrained  by liquidity than investors in the stock market. 
57. William C. Brainard,  John B. Shoven, and Laurence Weiss, "The Financial 
Valuation of the Return to Capital," BPEA, 2:1980, pp. 453-502. 118  Brookings Papers on Economic  Activity,  1:1981 
both debt and equity, it shows a strong positive correlation with inflation. 
As the authors emphasize, it is hard to explain a priori why required rates 
of return should have risen so much in recent years. However, in model- 
ing the effect of recent inflation, it is conservative to assume that the re- 
quired rate of return on equity has remained constant. 
A  fully  satisfactory treatment of  tax effect on  the  required rate of 
return must await the development of a general equilibrium model with 
several types of capital in which savings are determined by intertemporal 
optimization. This is an important area for future research. 
Conclusions 
It is generally accepted that incentives to spur investment in plant and 
equipment should be  designed to  maximize  the  additional investment 
generated per dollar of forgone revenue. Another appropriate objective 
is to minimize windfall gains and losses  to  owners of  existing capital. 
Alternative tax measures to  spur the  same  amount of  investment are 
likely to have very different effects on revenue and equity. The design and 
not just the size of increases in investment stimulus are thus important 
issues. 
One lesson that emerges is the desirability of focusing incentives on 
investment in plant and equipment rather than on saving in general. As 
emphasized in the preceding section, because the supply of funds to the 
corporate sector is highly elastic, only a fraction of any increase in na- 
tional saving would find its way into corporate capital. Much would be 
channeled into housing and into bidding up the price of inelastically sup- 
plied assets such as land. This argument applies equally to increases in 
saving achieved through tax incentives for savers and other measures such 
as larger government surpluses. 
The results suggest that the most desirable investment incentives are 
those that operate by reducing the effective purchase price of new capital 
goods. They maximize the investment "bang for the buck" and minimize 
the windfall to corporate shareholders upon enactment. Particularly to be 
avoided, according to the model, are reductions in dividend taxes. Their 
only permanent effect is to provide a windfall to existing corporate share- 
holders. The increase in the after-tax return to shareholders from reduc- 
tions in the dividend tax is exactly offset by the increased after-tax cost 
of retaining earnings. Reducing corporate tax rates has effects in between 
these extremes. Lawrence H. Summers  119 
Consideration of interactions between tax policy and inflation is essen- 
tial to policymaking. Inflation raises the effective taxation of corporate 
capital, causes large losses  to  corporate shareholders, and reduces the 
rate of capital accumulation. As long as the tax system is not indexed, 
distortions will be caused by inflation, even if it is anticipated and involves 
no relative price changes. Another lesson of this paper is the importance 
of the announcement and timing effects of tax changes. While increases 
in the investment tax credit or accelerated depreciation stimulate invest- 
ment, the effects of those increases will depend critically on the timing of 
announcement and enactment. An  even more dramatic example of the 
importance of timing is provided by the corporate tax rate. Because of 
accelerated depreciation, an announced but not yet implemented perma- 
nent tax cut will have a larger impact on investment than will a permanent 
cut that has already been made. Appropriate policy announcements can 
thus increase investment without substantial revenue costs. By combining 
policies, it is possible to spur investment without revenue cost or wind- 
falls. 
APPENDIX  A 
The  Derivation  of Q 
THIS  APPENDIX draws  on  earlier work  by  others,  especially  Fumio 
Hayashi, to show that under certain circumstances there is an exact cor- 
respondence between average q as measured in the conventional way and 
the shadow price of capital or "marginal"  q associated with dynamic op- 
timization of a firm's  value in the presence of adjustment costs.58  The link 
between average and marginal q requires certain adjustments for tax ef- 
fects, as is described in the text. Once these adjustments are made, it is 
shown that an econometric investment equation can be used to estimate 
the aggregate adjustment-cost function. This provides the basis for the 
estimates of the effects of tax policy reported in the paper. 
58. Fumio Hayashi, "Tobin's  Marginal q and Average q: A Neoclassical Inter- 
pretation," Discussion  Paper  (Center  for  Mathematical Studies in  Economics 
and Management  Science, Northwestern University, March 1981),  forthcoming in 
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I begin by examining how individuals value corporate stock and then 
turn to the decision problem facing a firm. Throughout it is assumed that 
a firm neither issues new equity nor repurchases existing shares.59  Hence 
share prices are proportional to the outstanding value of a firm's equity. 
It is also assumed that equity holders require a fixed real after-tax return, 
p, in order to induce them to hold the outstanding equity. It is assumed 
that the value of p is not affected by either changes in tax rules or the 
quantity of equity. The required return, p, is the sum of capital gains and 
dividends net of tax. It follows that 
(A-1)  (p +  w)Vt  =  (1  -  c)Vt  +  (1  -  6)Divt1 
where c is the capital gains tax rate on an accrual basis and 0 is the divi- 
dend tax rate.60  All investors are assumed to have the same tax rates. 
This differential equation can be solved to find the time path of V. In or- 
der to ensure a unique solution, it is necessary to impose a condition that 
rules out explosive behavior. The transversality condition that guarantees 
a unique solution to A-1 is 
(A-2)  lim V, (exp  J(  +  )  du)  =0. 
With this condition satisfied and the assumption of perfect foresight about 
future dividends, the solution to A- 1 becomes 
(A-3)  Vt =  ;  (  Div, (exp  f  C  du)ds. 
Each firm  is assumed to produce with constant returns  to scale and to be 
perfectly competitive in all markets, taking as given the price of its output, 
the wage, and the rate of return required by investors. These competitive 
assumptions, together with the requirement that capital is homogeneous, 
59. Under the conditions described  below, a firm would never want to issue new 
equity. Legal restrictions  severely limit the firm's  ability to repurchase  its own shares 
as a device for avoiding dividend  taxation. For a discussion of these restrictions  and 
the limitations  of other mechanisms  that might seem to be functionally equivalent  to 
repurchasing  shares, see Alan J. Auerbach, "Wealth  Maximization and the Cost of 
Capital,"  Qluarterly Jolurnal of  Economics,  vol. 93 (August 1979), pp. 433-46. 
60. The capital gains tax rate corresponds  to the statutory rate adjusted  for de- 
ferral and the lack of constructive  realization  at death. An additional  complication is 
introduced  by the absence of full-loss offset provisions in the tax code. 
61.  Feldstein shows an approach  to handling  the case of heterogeneous  investors. 
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are essential to the derivation of the linkage between market valuation 
and investment incentives that is discussed below. 
The typical firm seeks to choose an investment and financial policy to 
maximize A-3 subject to the constraints given by its initial capital stock, 
by a requirement  that the sources of funds equal the uses, and the require- 
ment, discussed in the text, that the firm maintains debt equal to a fixed 
fraction, b, of the capital stock. 
A crucial feature of the model is that there is a cost to changing the 
capital stock. Without this cost, the size of the firm would be indeter- 
minate because of the constant returns to  scale and the assumption of 
perfect competition. The cost of installing additional capital rises with 
rate of capital accumulation, thereby preventing jumps in the demand for 
capital. The cost function is taken to be convex and homogeneous in in- 
vestment and capital. Under these conditions, dividends can be derived 
as after-tax profits minus investment expenses.62  Thus, 
(A-4)  Div =  [pF(K, L) -  wL -  pbiK] (1 -  ) 
-  (1  -  ITC  -  b  +  (1  -  r)O)pI 
+  7D  +  pbK(-r  1R), 
where 
K and L =  factor inputs 
p  =  overall price level 
F(K, L) =  production function 
w = wage rate 
i  =  the nominal interest rate 
r  =  corporate tax rate 
ITC = investment tax credit 
0  =  adjustment-cost function, assumed to be convex 
I  =  investment 
61R  =  rate of economic depreciation of the capital stock 
D  =  value of currently allowable depreciation allowances. 
The calculation of D  assumes that the rate of depreciation used for tax 
62. The assumption  here is that all marginal equity finance comes from retained 
earnings. This follows from the assumption of a constant number of shares made 
earlier. It accounts for some of the apparently  paradoxical results described below. 
The last term reflects  the net receipts from issuance of new debt (withdrawals) nec- 
essary  to maintain  the ratio of debt to capital as the capital stock depreciates  and the 
price level rises. 122  Brookings Papers on Economic  Activity,  1:1981 
purposes reflects accelerated depreciation and that tax  depreciation is 
based on historical cost. Adjustment costs are considered expensed and 
ineligible for the investment tax credit. If these costs are taken to repre- 
sent managerial effort, or interference with concurrent production, the 
assumption made here is appropriate. Treating adjustment expenses  as 
investment under the tax law would not importantly alter the results. 
Combining equations A-3 and A-4  and separating the terms reflecting 
the value of depreciation allowances on existing capital, B,  and future 
acquisitions, Z,  yields  an expression  for the  market value  of  a firm's 
equity at time t: 
(A-5) VG t  ((PF(K,  L)  -wL  -pbKi)(l-T)(I  ITC-  Z-  b 
+  (1 -  r)  k)pI +  pbK(r  -  6R))  (1  -  0)t  ds +  Bt. 
All the tax parameters can be arbitrary  functions of time. For the pur- 
pose of exposition the following symbols are introduced: 
(A-6a)  =  exp  P  -u  +  ) 
(A-6b)  Bt =  r.65ty  (1T-c  KDEPt [exp(-6T)(S-t)]  ds 
00 
(A-6c)  z=  r6  T yu  [exp(-bT)(u  -  s)] du. 
A  Us 
The Bt  variable represents the present value of  depreciation allow- 
ances on existing capital;63  the Z8 is the present value, evaluated at time s 
of the depreciation allowances, on a dollar of new investment. 
In maximizing equation A-5, the firm can ignore Bt because it is inde- 
pendent of  any current or future decisions. The constraint that capital 
accumulation equals net investment faced by the firm in maximizing A-5 
is 
(A-7)  KS  =  IS-  RK. 
This dynamic optimization problem can be solved using the Pontryagin 
maximum principle. A  shadow price, X(t),  is introduced for the  con- 
63. The KDEPt refers to the depreciable capital stock at time t. It differs from 
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straint given by A-7. It can be interpreted as marginal q, the change in a 
firm's value resulting from a unit increment to the capital stock. The first- 
order conditions for optimality are64 
w 
(A-8a)  FL  =- 
p 
(A-8b)  1-  ITC  -  Z  -  b +  k(1-)  +  I  O'(1  -C  =  (1  -  c) 
K  ~~~p(l  -  ) 
(A-8c)  _=  _)+  -  ((pFK -  bi)(I -  r) -()  -  T)o 
+  b(r  -  R))  (1-  ) 
The first-order condition,  equation A-8a,  implies that labor is hired 
until its marginal product and wage are equal. Equation A-8b character- 
izes the investment function; it implicitly defines a function linking invest- 
ment to the real shadow price of capital, Alp, the tax parameters, and the 
costs of adjustment. This equation has an intuitive explanation. The right- 
hand side is the shadow price of additional capital goods, which is equal 
to their marginal cost in after-tax corporate dollars on the left-hand side. 
The condition for zero investment is 
(A-9)  (  )  =  (I-?)  [1-ITC-Z-bi. 
Equation A-9 implies that there will be investment even if the shadow 
price of new capital goods is less than 1. This is because taxes and debt 
finance reduce the effective price of new capital goods.  The third first- 
order condition, A-8c,  describes the evolution of the shadow price, X. It 
guarantees that the shadow price equals the present value of the future 
marginal products of a unit of capital. In this model, capital investment 
is productive in terms of output and, because of the form of the adjust- 
ment-cost function, in reducing the cost of subsequent investment. 
Equation A-8b is of no operational significance as a theory of invest- 
ment unless an observable counterpart to the shadow price, A/p, can be 
obtained. Hayashi has shown in a similar model with a less elaborate tax 
64. Similar first-order  conditions with different  assumptions  about tax effects can 
be found in Abel, "Empirical  Investment Equations,"  and Hayashi, "Tobin's Mar- 
ginal  q and Average  q." 124  Brookings Papers on Economic  Activity,  1:1981 
system how the shadow price is linked to the market valuation of existing 
capital.65 
This link can be demonstrated as follows. Note that Vt -  Bt given by 
equation A-5  is homogeneous in Kt-that  is, a doubling of Kt together 
with the optimal doubling of investment and labor in every subsequent 
period will double Vt -  Bt. This is a consequence of the constant-returns- 
to-scale production function and the homogeneity of the adjustment-cost 
function. It follows directly that 
(A-10)  V-  Bt=  yptKt, 
where V* is the stock market's value at time t when the optimal path is 
followed. In other words, the maximized value of the firm at time t minus 
the value of depreciation allowances on existing capital is proportional to 
the value of its initial capital stock. The maximum principle implies that 
(A-  1)  dVt  - 
dKt 
This is what is meant by the assertion that X is the shadow price of new 
investment, or marginal q. Combining equations A- 10 and A- 1  1 demon- 
strates that 
(A- 12)  -  , - 
This expression provides an observable counterpart for the shadow price 
of new investment if it is assumed that the firm maximizes value so that 
Vt =  V*. It implies that the investment function can be written 
/(V-B)(1-c)  I  +  b +  ITC  +  z 
(A-  1  3)  R =  h  pK(1-)  h-QCZ 
where Q is the tax-adjusted q and h(*)  =  (q +  (I/K)q')-'. 
For convenience, it is assumed that adjustment costs per unit of capi- 
tal are zero up to some normal level of investment, and then rise linearly 
with investment above that level. In particular, total adjustment costs for 
65. Hayashi, "Tobin's Marginal q and Average q." For a more rigorous proof 
than the heuristic argument given here, see  M. Salinger and L.  Summers, "Tax 
Reform and Corporate Investment: A  Microeconometric Simulation Study," in 
Martin Feldstein, ed., Tax Simulation  Analysis,  forthcoming. Lawrence  H. Summers  125 
a level of investment, I, are given by 
(A-14)  A  - -y  K  if  (  y  > o 
A =O  if  -  ly  <  0. 
It follows that the function p  ()  is given by 
AtI  02 
(A-15)  <,I  t 
K 
which is homogeneous in I/K  as required. 
This implies that the investment function, A-1 3, can be written as 
(A-16)  I  =  h-1 (Q)  =y  +  Q  K 
where Q represents tax-adjusted Tobin's q. This is the linear relation be- 
tween investment and Q that is estimated in the text. 
APPENDIX  B 
Description  of the Components  of Q in Equation  11 
Description 
V  The stock market value of  all nonfinancial corporations at the 
beginning of the year is estimated by capitalizing nonfinancial 
corporate dividends using the Standard and Poor's dividend 
yield. For  1947-78,  fourth-quarter dividends from the previ- 
ous year are capitalized using the average fourth-quarter divi- 
dend price ratio for the preceding year. 
K  The capital stock, K, at the beginning of the year is taken to be 
the sum of equipment, structures, and inventories, all valued 
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B  The present value of depreciation allowances is estimated in sev- 
eral stages. First, the value of the depreciable capital stock is 
calculated using the perpetual inventory method and annual 
data on investment and tax depreciation. Second, the tax de- 
preciation rate is estimated as the ratio of tax depreciation to 
depreciable capital stock. Third, B is calculated from equation 
A-6b,  using the current corporate tax rate and the corporate 
bond rate as the discount rate. This discount rate was chosen 
because the stream of future depreciation allowances, unlike 
the stream of future profits, is close to being risk free in nomi- 
nal terms. 
b  The ratio of the market value of outstanding corporate debt, less 
financial assets, to the capital stock, Kt, is a proxy for the value 
of b. While the analysis above justifies the use of this proxy 
only in the case in which all debt is short term, it is approxi- 
mately valid for the case of long-term debt.66  The market value 
of debt is estimated by capitalizing net interest payments at 
the Baa corporate bonds rate.67 
c  It is difficult to measure the effective tax rate on capital gains be- 
cause  of  the problems inherent in  estimating the  effects  of 
deferral and the absence of constructive realization at death. 
Following Bailey it is assumed that each of these factors di- 
vides the effective rate in half. From 1932 to  1969, the statu- 
tory rate on  capital gains was  half the rate on  dividends.68 
Hence for this period the capital gains rate was estimated at 
12.5 percent of the average marginal dividend tax rate.69  For 
the  1969-78  period,  this rate is  assumed to  be  50  percent 
66. This follows because exactly offsetting adjustment  must be made to  b for 
capital gains or losses realized by firms on outstanding  debt. In a taxless world, this 
treatment  leads to Tobin's q variable as defined for bonds plus equity. 
67. This procedure  would be strictly appropriate  only if all bonds were consols. 
Comparing  the results with those of von Furstenberg,  "Corporate  Investment,"  sug- 
gests that the error is not likely to be large. 
68.  Martin J. Bailey, "Capital  Gains and Income Taxation," in Arnold C. Har- 
berger  and Martin  J. Bailey, eds., The Taxation  of  Income  from  Capital  (Brookings 
Institution,  1969),pp.  11-49. 
69. The construction  of this series is discussed  below. Lawrence H. Summers  127 
higher, or  18.75  percent of  the dividend rate, reflecting the 
effect of the 1969 capital gains reforms.70 
0  The marginal tax rate on dividends is estimated as a weighted 
average of individual marginal rates with weights equal to the 
share of dividends to taxpayers in each marginal rate class.71 
Because of data limitations, equity owned outside the house- 
hold sector is not included. 
ITC  The  effective rate of the investment tax credit is the  statutory 
rate, as adjusted by Data Resources, Incorporated, to reflect 
the effects of eligibility rules, multiplied by the sample average 
share of investment devoted to equipment. 
Z  The present value of future depreciation allowances on a dollar 
of investment is calculated on the basis of tax lifetime and de- 
preciation methods actually used  as estimated by Data  Re- 
sources, Incorporated. Static expectations  about future cor- 
porate tax rates are assumed. A  fixed-weight average of the 
figures for equipment and structure  is used. 
The corporate tax rate is the statutory marginal tax rate on cor- 
porate income.72 
70.  These reforms included the minimum tax, maximum tax, and special provi- 
sions relating to preference income. The suggestion that these reforms raised effec- 
tive rates by about 50 percent is derived from the TAXSIM model of the National 
Bureau  of Economic Research. 
71. A  zero marginal tax rate is assigned to dividends sheltered in the Keogh 
plans and similar plans. The series are taken with adjustment  from Colin Wright, 
"Saving and the Rate of Interest,"  in Harberger and Bailey, eds., The Taxation of 
Income From Capital, pp. 275-300  and Roger E. Brinner and Stephen H. Brooks, 
"Stock  Prices,"  in Henry J. Aaron and Joseph A. Pechman, eds., How Taxes Affect 
Economic Behavior (Brookings Institution, 1981), pp. 199-240. 
72. This series is taken from John J. Seater, "Marginal Federal Personal and 
Corporate  Income Tax Rates in the U.S., 1909-1975," Research Paper 57 (Federal 
Reserve Bank of Philadelphia,  November 1980). Comments 
and Discussion 
Barry P. Bosworth:  Larry Summers has provided a useful and interesting 
contribution to the exploding literature on the effect of tax policy on capi- 
tal formation. The first part of the paper reports on some extensions of 
the neoclassical model of investment demand in three areas. These in- 
clude a more elaborate treatment of taxation, the use of  stock market 
values as a source of information on investors' perceptions of the profit- 
ability of investment, and the linkage between investment (a flow concept) 
and changes in the demand for capital (a stock concept). 
The formulation of  an empirically testable version of  the neoclassi- 
cal investment model,  inclusive  of  taxation,  derives from the work  of 
Haavelmo,  Jorgenson, Hall,  and others in the  1960s.  That formulation 
assumed that the after-tax required return faced by the firm was constant, 
and it  dealt only  with  corporate taxes.  By  assuming a  fixed after-tax 
return, the model forced tax changes to rebound forward onto the price 
of investment rather than backward on the return to savings. The assump- 
tion, together with the specification of a Cobb-Douglas production func- 
tion  (with the potential for substantial substitution between capital and 
labor inputs),  accentuated the effect of taxes on investment. 
This paper goes a step further in assuming that corporate managers act 
to maximize the after-tax position of their shareholders. Thus it incor- 
porates the personal income tax on dividends and capital gains into the 
analysis. It also assumes that the after-tax real rate of return required by 
savers is fixed. This latter assumption is particularly crucial because it 
implies that the elasticity of the supply of funds for corporate investment 
is infinite and that all tax changes will rebound forward onto changes in 
the price of investment. The analysis thus provides an upper bound on 
the potential effects of tax policy on investment demand. 
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By integrating personal taxes into the analysis, Summers has merged 
two areas of economic analysis, production theory and valuation theory, 
into one. In more traditional analysis, valuation theory enters the discus- 
sion of the determinant of the cost of capital to the firm and the choice 
between debt and equity finance. 
In undertaking this merger, Summers makes several very restrictive 
assumptions. First, the firm can neither issue nor retire stock. Second, the 
amount of external debt is rigidly tied to the replacement value of the 
capital stock. There is, therefore, no decision on the financing side-in- 
vestment requires the  reduction of  dividends; that is,  production  and 
financing decisions become one and the same. Summers cites Auerbach as 
justification for the view that stock issues are unimportant. Perhaps this 
is a judgment issue but I would note that such issues have varied annually 
from 1 to 13 percent of capital investment over the last decade and repre- 
sent a much larger share of external financing. Similarly, data supplied by 
von  Furstenberg does  not  imply that the ratio of  debt to  capital is  a 
constant. 
The abnormalities introduced by this assumption are most evident in 
the analysis, which suggests that announcement of a future rise in divi- 
dend taxes will reduce investment before it takes place and will raise it 
afterward. To transfer income to stockholders at the temporary low tax 
rate, firms must cut investment. In the more traditional valuation frame- 
work a firm would borrow money to prepay dividends without the need 
to disrupt its investment plans. 
A more interesting example of the role of the assumptions is provided 
by the statement that the dividend tax rate has no influence on the capital 
stock in a long-run steady-state. That would appear to make the reduc- 
tion of the highest income tax rates a pure windfall. Because investment 
must be financed by reducing dividends, the cost to the investor is (1 -  0), 
where 6 is the tax rate. Later, when the return on investment raises divi- 
dends, they are taxed at (1  -  6).  So when costs and returns are equated, 
the dividend-tax rate cancels from both sides of the expression. A perma- 
nent tax increase reduces the cost of investment by the same amount that 
it reduces future receipts. Even at a 100 percent tax rate the fact that the 
investor gains nothing is offset by the fact that investment costs nothing. 
In the steady state the income from capital is just adequate to maintain its 
growth. Capital gains cannot provide financing for investment nor a sub- 
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restrictive assumptions and vanish in a model with more than one source 
of financing. In the more general case, the tax on dividends is part of the 
taxation of capital income and will affect the desired capital stock. 
The conclusion  that dividend taxes do  not  affect investment in this 
model is not surprising because it is the same result that is obtained for 
the independence of the capital stock and the corporate tax rate when 
investment is expensed in the period in which it is made. This does not 
imply the absence of taxes, only that they are not paid at the margin. In 
other words, an oil company pays taxes, but the corporate tax does not 
affect its decision on how many exploratory wells to drill. In the same 
sense,  there continues  to  be  a  dividend tax  in  Summers' world,  even 
though the equivalence of dividends and investment at the margin implies 
that it does not affect the steady-state capital stock. The conclusions about 
the corporate tax, however, are much more robust with respect to the as- 
sumptions than his conclusions for the dividend tax. 
The second major contribution is in the amendment of Tobin's q con- 
cept for taxes in a way that parallels the formulation of the rental price 
by Jorgenson and others. The analysis draws heavily from a paper by 
Hayashi that gives such an adjustment for corporate taxes. Because the 
purpose of  using market valuation  data in  investment equations is  to 
determine if useful information is provided on investor perceptions of 
opportunities, the failure in several past studies to adjust for changes in 
dividend and capital gains taxes is a significant omission. Summers is most 
struck by the secular decline in the unadjusted q ratio (the ratio of the 
firm's market value to its capital stock).  I am most struck by the tremen- 
dous variability in the adjusted measure, Q. Looking  at the terms that 
make up the adjustment, I am puzzled about the source of the variability; 
it does  not appear to be  accounted for by any of  the tax components 
Summers reports, so presumably it reflects variations in q. 
One difficulty with the use of stock market valuation to infer investor 
perception of physical investment opportunities is that the information 
must be taken in toto. But the information relevant to investment may be 
overshadowed by the volatility of  the "noise" in stock market fluctua- 
tions. For example, a high q in 1929 should not have implied that busi- 
nessmen should buy more K; rather, they should  sell more  V. In this 
respect, it seems inappropriate to use an extremely weak empirical corre- 
lation between the stock market and investment to infer tax policy effects 
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on stock prices is greatly dependent upon the valuation theory adopted. 
A second difficulty is that the argument Hayashi and Summers make for 
a stable relation between average and marginal q does not deal with the 
problem of capital obsolescence that Baily's paper in this issue stresses. 
Third, much of the existing theoretical literature is directed toward 
defining the determinants of the desired capital stock, while the process 
of investment as a transition from one  stock to  another is given short 
shrift. Summers argues that this model solves that difficulty  by incorporat- 
ing an explicit adjustment function by which costs rise with the rate of 
investment. That is true, but it is still ad hoc in nature and is little differ- 
ent in its implication from the models of Lucas, Gould, Treadway, and 
others who  made similar assumptions within the standard neoclassical 
model. The nature of those costs is still unknown, and to assert that the 
costs of investment rise with the level of investment is to assume away the 
question of whether or not a marginal efficiency of investment schedule 
exists at the micro level. 
From my own perspective, the major feature of investment in practice 
that continues to be ignored in theory is its irreversibility. There is not a 
full resale market for capital, and models that assume myopic decision- 
making miss the fixed-cost characteristic of capital that is such a dominant 
feature of the micro analysis. Such models pass relatively quickly over 
the first-order issue  of  expected  future utilization of  new  capital  and 
place  relatively heavy stress on  the second-order issue  of  the  optimal 
degree of capital intensity. Thus there has always been a contrast between 
the empirical models that find a dominant role for output expectations 
(a  scale factor)  and the theoretical models  that place  equal stress on 
relative prices (factor intensity). 
Finally, Summers cites one of his previous papers on saving in a life- 
cycle model in support of a view that interest rates have a larger positive 
effect on saving than previously believed. That paper reaches such a con- 
clusion because a rise in interest rates reduces the present value of future 
labor income,  thus reducing the individual's current consumption. But 
the paper ignores the role of wealth that exists at the time the change in 
interest rate occurs. The effect on people who hold substantial wealth at 
the time of the change in the interest rate is ambiguous. Those holding 
short-term assets will  experience  a  substantial rise in  future after-tax 
income and thus increase their consumption. I do not believe the paper 
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highlight, in my mind, that the effect of interest rates on saving will de- 
pend on the ratio of initial current wealth to future labor income. Thus 
short-term aggregate analysis may provide misleading empirical analysis 
because  of  the mixture of  individuals in  different financial situations. 
From this perspective, tax measures are likely to  be more effective in 
increasing saving if they are focused on individuals who have not yet ac- 
cumulated significant wealth. 
Despite  my reservations about the model  and the  ambiguity of  the 
empirical findings, the policy simulation produces empirical results that 
are not violently different from those obtained with more conventional 
neoclassical  models  such as that of  Jorgenson. The  Jorgenson model, 
with today's tax laws, implies that an 8 percent inflation rate would re- 
duce the desired capital stock by about 20 percent. Because Summers in- 
cludes personal as well as corporate taxes, his estimate of 28 percent may 
be consistent with estimates from conventional  models.  But  again, the 
methodology is designed to maximize the estimated impact of taxes on 
investment. It does not directly address continuing disagreements among 
economists about the magnitude of the critical parameters. An observa- 
tion of a positive but weak correlation between investment and the stock 
market, for example, does not resolve the empirical debate over the mag- 
nitude of the elasticity of factor substitution between capital and labor 
any more than Jorgenson's assertion that the world was Cobb-Douglas 
satisfied Robert Eisner. 
James Tobin and Philip M. White:  One explanation offered for the ob- 
served decline in real stock prices and in q in the 1970s is the interaction 
of higher inflation with nonneutral taxes. This has also been put forth as 
an explanation for the alleged poor performance of nonresidential capital 
investment during the same period. 
Larry Summers' paper examines both hypotheses and shows how they 
are connected.  However,  in his introductory empirical review he  finds 
that, partly because of the recent revision of the national income account, 
the performance of  corporate fixed investment was  not  as much of  a 
problem as previously perceived. He also found in reviewing tax legisla- 
tion changes during the 1970s that reductions in the taxation of equity in- 
come have compensated in part for some of the distortions introduced by 
inflation. 
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decade relative to earlier postwar years. This was not true of net invest- 
ment as estimated by the Department of Commerce. A shift toward equip- 
ment away from structures, together with a rise in the capital-output ratio, 
led to higher replacement investment. Inflation in its interaction with his- 
torical cost depreciation is one reason for the shift toward shorter-lived 
capital goods  but  other factors might have  contributed. For  one,  the 
relative price of structures vis-a-vis equipment has increased. According 
to  the  revised national  product accounts,  the  1979  GNP  deflator for 
structures was twice its 1972 level while the equipment deflator had risen 
only 60 percent. The investment tax credit also favors short-lived capital; 
every time it is replaced the investor receives both the credit and full 
depreciation. 
The inflation-tax story is not the only explanation for the shortfall of 
investment, to the extent that there was one, and for the performance of 
the stock  market. Other observers have pointed  to  the recessions  and 
excess capacity that characterized much of the decade, to oil and energy 
shocks, and to greater  macroeconomic risks perceived by business and the 
general public because of stagflation and the expected side effects of anti- 
inflationary policies. 
The model Larry Summers has constructed to explore these issues is 
impressive and ingenious. It has several noteworthy features. One impor- 
tant innovation is that firms in Summers' economy incorporate the tax 
position of their shareholders. In effect, firms invest up to the point at 
which the cost of investment in terms of after-tax dividends equals the 
increase in the firms' value  after capital gains taxes.  Valuation  in  the 
model is the present value of dividends given a perfect foresight path of 
wages, interest rates, inflation, and tax policy. Thus there are no system- 
atic prediction errors and, as Lucas wants us all to make sure, no five- 
hundred-dollar bills on the sidewalk. 
The incorporation of taxes in both valuation and investment strategy 
is important in interpreting movements of  q and investment when  tax 
parameters change. As Summers points out, conventional q and invest- 
ment could theoretically move in opposite directions. A cut in taxes on 
capital income could spur investment to the point that the increase in the 
capital stock so increases future real wages that all the benefit from the 
tax cut flows to labor. 
Firms in the model never issue or retire any equity. It is this assumption 
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affect investment in the steady state. In effect, a cut in dividend taxes 
increases in  proportion the  opportunity cost  of  current investment in 
terms of after-tax dividends and the benefit in capital gains. 
Although firms optimize retained earnings relative to dividends, they 
maintain a constant ratio of debt to replacement cost of capital. In this 
respect they are not completely rational. The debt-to-equity ratio, even 
if it had been chosen optimally at zero inflation, would not remain the 
same at higher inflation rates. It would be higher because the tax deduct- 
ibility of nominal debt interest payments would be more valuable. 
An  adjustment cost  theory explains  the level  of  investment. In  the 
simulations, which use an estimated adjustment cost function, these costs 
are substantial. In the steady state, the average cost of adjustment is 22 
percent of the price of a machine, and the marginal cost of adjustment is 
approximately 1.94 times the commodity cost of capital. This means that 
adjustment costs raise the total resource cost for that marginal machine 
from 1 to nearly 3. That is a lot! 
Summers estimates adjustment costs by inverting empirical regressions 
of investment on his tax-adjusted q series. There is great merit in the 
adjustment cost story, but maybe it need not be taken so literally and 
exclusively. Despite the parable of the five-hundred-dollar  bills mentioned 
above, one should not exclude the possibility that it simply takes time for 
firms to respond to incentives and that the distributed lag regression of 
investment on q reflects disequilibrium. 
Aggregation is another explanation for why inverting the investment 
equation exaggerates adjustment costs. The observed aggregates conceal 
a dispersion of q-values and investment rates across firms. Movements of 
the aggregates reflect nonlinear responses by low-q and high-q firms. 
Summers enumerates four sources of nonneutrality in the tax system. 
These are the deductibility of nominal interest payments, historical cost 
depreciation, FIFO  inventory accounting, and the taxation of  nominal 
capital gains. 
One general point, which perhaps everyone knows but sometimes ap- 
pears to have forgotten, is that there is a basic nonlinearity in the tax loss 
due to historical cost depreciation whereas the gain from interest deduct- 
ibility is linear in inflation. Figures  1 and 2 below  illustrate this point. 
On the horizontal axis is inflation and on the vertical axis is the required 
rate of return which for a given steady state of real investment keeps q 
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Figure  1. Nonlinear  Effect of Inflation  on Internal  Rate of Return  (AD), 
Depreciation  Tax Loss Only 
Internal  rate of return 
A  (R_-S_)_(l-_T) 
Tax loss 
R(l1-)- 
0  Inflation  rate 
Notes:  The symbol R is the gross real before-tax rate of return; 6 is the depreciation rate; and r is the 
tax rate. 
historical cost  depreciation is  plotted.  Along  AD  the  internal rate of 
return decreases with inflation but is  asymptotic to  a lower  limit.  No 
matter how high inflation is, the most the firm can lose is the value of this 
depreciation tax deduction. For example, if the depreciation rate is 8 per- 
cent and the tax rate is 50 percent, the maximum loss of rate of return 
due to historical cost accounting is 4 percentage points. 
If the firm borrows enough to maintain its debt at a constant fraction 
of the replacement cost of its capital stock and the nominal interest rate 
rises point  for point with  inflation, the  benefit of  the  deductibility of 
interest payments is the tax rate times the ratio of debt to replacement cost 
times the rate of inflation. This is linear in inflation and plotted as curve 
AF in figure 2. Subtracting the loss due to depreciation from AF gives a 
curve like ABCD.  At point B inflation has done its worst and beyond 
points like C the gain from the interest deductibility exceeds the deprecia- 
tion loss. 
For the values in Summers'  paper, the point B occurs at 9 percent infla- 
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Figure  2. Effect  of Inflation  on Internal  Rate of Return  (ABCD), Depreciation  Tax 
Loss and  Interest  Deductibility  Gain 
Internal  rate of return 
TS,  maximum  depreciation  loss 
A~  ~~~~~~~~~  Depreciation  loat 
Notes:  Same as figure 1; b is the debt share of investment financing. 
deductibility of  nominal interest, the capital stock corresponding to  a 
constant real after-tax discount rate would start to increase as inflation 
increased  past  9  percent. 
Summers' paper differs from these graphs because his real discount 
rate involves the real capital gains tax on individual share-owners, which 
rises  linearly  with inflation.  In his simulations,  the discount  rate increases 
approximately  two-tenths  of  a  point  for  every  eight  points  of  inflation. 
If the capital gains tax were high enough, an increase in inflation would 
always depress investment. This  turns out  not  to  be  the  case  for  the 
parameters in the paper. 
The taxation of nominal capital gains has a potent effect on investment. 
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10.6 percent fall in the capital stock when inflation jumps from zero to 
8 percent. There are two reasons why this effect may be overstated. First, 
the effective capital gains rate is a decreasing function of inflation because 
the ratio of realizations to accruals falls with inflation. Second, the size 
of the adjustment costs add to the effect of the capital gains tax. Inflation 
causes nominal capital gains not only on the capital equipment but also 
on the inframarginal rents that accrue from the "right" to  accumulate 
capital goods. In the simulations these rents are very large, as suggested 
by the difference noted above between the marginal and average costs of 
adjustment. To the extent that these rents are overestimated, the effect of 
the capital gains nonneutrality is overstated. 
The final source of nonneutrality is the payment of extra taxes because 
of FIFO  inventory accounting. Inventories are not  explicitly modeled; 
the effect of FIFO is approximated as an increase in the corporate tax 
rate of about 1 ?/3 points for every point of inflation. 
To 'count FIFO as a tax-cum-inflation deterrent of investment seems 
dubious. First, these extra taxes are voluntary. Second, if managers con- 
tinue to use FIFO because they are as yet unaware of the extra taxes they 
are incurring, then this illusion should extend to whatever effects FIFO 
might have on their investment decisions. Third, in the long run-and 
this paper is about the long run-all  firms will switch to LIFO given the 
large costs (five-hundred-dollar bills on the sidewalk) of doing otherwise. 
Fourth, even if FIFO accounting were required, the connection between 
plant and equipment decisions and taxes due to inventory profits is tenu- 
ous. These taxes might decrease inventory investment, to be sure, but why 
plant and equipment rather than labor input? 
The effect of inflation is to reduce the value of the tax deduction for 
the costs of goods sold, which are wages and material costs. Treating the 
corporate sector as Summers does, as composed of identical competing 
vertically integrated firms, costs of goods sold are essentially just wages. 
Thus the extra taxes due to nominal inventory profits are a tax on the 
variable lagged input, labor, not on capital. Cost of goods sold is to labor 
and materials input what historical cost depreciation is to capital input. 
In Summers' economy labor is inelastically supplied and the only effect 
FIFO taxes can have is to reduce real wages. The mystery in the model, 
however, remains; why has  not  competition  forced  all firms to  adopt 
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The same points made above concerning historical cost depreciation 
apply to FIFO. The FIFO tax loss increases with inflation in a nonlinear 
fashion and is bounded by the tax value of the deduction of variable input 
costs.  If  some fixed proportion of  the value  of  inventories is financed 
through short-term debt, at high rates of inflation the value of the interest 
deductions associated with this debt will exceed the loss due to FIFO. 
The results of the paper are extremely sensitive, not only in magnitude 
but in direction, to the assumption that share-owners' after-tax required 
real rate of  return is constant. Incidentally, this  assumption stands in 
contrast to  the  constant before-tax  real interest rate assumed on  cor- 
porate debt. A fall in the required rate of return of 20 basis points offsets 
the effect of inflation via capital gains tax. A fall of 50 basis points en- 
tirely offsets the  effects of  8  percent inflation  (aside  from  FIFO  tax 
payments). 
Thus even a small elasticity of the rate of return with respect to the 
quantity of capital would mitigate the large reductions in the steady-state 
capital stock that the simulations predict. But the issue is not really the 
slope of savers' supply of equity but rather whether the whole schedule 
shifted during the 1970s. The evidence that it has includes the fact that 
the real tax-exempt bond rate, even if corrected for changes in the ap- 
plicable marginal tax rate implicit in the rate differential from Aaa cor- 
porate bonds, fell by at least 3 points during the past decade while inflation 
rose by 7 points. 
Summers rationalizes his assumption of  an unchanged discount rate 
somewhat differently. Perhaps somewhere in the world there is an asset 
whose return sets the opportunity cost for corporate capital. Evidently 
this asset cannot be debt. He suggests that it is housing, especially owner- 
occupied housing, whose favorable tax treatment is enhanced by inflation. 
But no  crowding out of  fixed investment by housing  shows up in  the 
figures. The boom year of 1979 was a big year for nonresidential invest- 
ment but  a very poor year for  housing  construction.  In  1972  dollars 
housing was only 4 percent of GNP,  compared to 4.5  to  5  percent at 
earlier cyclical peaks. 
The assumption of a constant required rate of return is both important 
and dubious. It may be true that the rate of return required by equity 
investors has been increased by perceptions of  higher macroeconomic 
risk, a hypothesis suggested near the start of these comments. But this is 
quite a different  theory of the behavior of the stock market and investment Lawrence H. Summers  139 
from the tax and inflation explanation espoused in  this paper, and in 
earlier influential papers by Feldstein  and Summers together and indi- 
vidually. 
It was fun to work on this paper, and our comments show that it can 
generate a lot of interest. The paper is impressive in both substance and 
method. More can be done in the same spirit. 
General  Discussion 
Several panelists recommended caution in drawing policy conclusions 
from Summers' results. William Nordhaus noted the sensitivity of Sum- 
mers' results to estimates of the effective capital gains tax rate. He  re- 
ported that calculations of that rate based on a comparison of estimates 
of nominal capital gains on private assets from national wealth accounts 
and actual payments indicate a much smaller rate than that calculated by 
Summers. Summers' assumption of a constant after-tax real rate of return 
on equity and the implicit very high interest elasticity of savings available 
to the corporate sector drew considerable comment. Franco Modigliani 
said that, unfortunately, theoretical models provide very little guidance 
about the elasticity of saving because the income and substitution effects 
of higher interest rates operate in opposite  directions. Indeed,  a priori 
he found nothing implausible about a zero or negative elasticity with re- 
spect to interest rates. Although empirical estimates of the elasticity are 
not  very reliable, Modigliani  believed  the  preponderance of  evidence 
places it near zero. Summers responded that, whatever the elasticity of 
total saving, the elasticity of funds to the corporate sector should be high. 
He agreed, however, that his analysis is more suitable for changes in the 
investment tax credit, most of which applies to the corporate sector, than 
for changes in the taxation of capital gains, most of which accrue to the 
noncorporate sectors of the economy. Modigliani questioned whether the 
effects of inflation on capital formation are accurately captured in a model 
that assumes the market fully understands the tax and distributional effects 
of inflation. He noted that his own work with Cohn suggests that the mar- 
ket has been badly confused, effectively treating nominal interest rates as 
if they were real. 
Robert Hall  discussed the theoretical and empirical issues raised by 
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avoid by changing their accounting or financial practices. Hall  asserted 
that voluntary taxes are not consistent with Summers' assumption that 
firms maximize stockholders' after-tax returns. In the absence of a satis- 
factory explanation of  why  firms pay taxes  they  could  avoid by  con- 
verting to LIFO inventory valuation, or pay dividends that are not de- 
ductible  at the corporate level  but  are taxable  as ordinary income  to 
stockholders, he  suggested that Summers should not push some of his 
results too hard. Hall was particularly skeptical of Summers' result that 
the dividend tax rate has no effect on the long-run capital stock. He also 
agreed with  James Tobin's  skepticism about the  effect of  taxation  of 
inventory profits on capital formation. 
Robin Marris recalled his own model of  the firm in which manage- 
ment maximizes its own  utility rather than that of  stockholders.  It is 
similar to Summers' model in many respects, including the fact that firms 
would  be  almost  entirely  self-financed; but  in  contrast  to  Summers' 
model, taxes on dividends would have a substantial effect on investment 
and the growth rate. 
Christopher Sims raised several questions about the empirical testing 
of  the model.  He  did not find it  surprising that Summers' investment 
equation performed poorly given the number of reasons one could expect 
variables in the equation to be subject to error and the possibilities for 
specification error. Some of these errors would lead to biases in particular 
coefficients. If, for example, the technology were putty-clay, one would 
expect fluctuations in Q that would not be related to investment. This 
might explain the implausibly large estimates of adjustment costs men- 
tioned by Tobin in his discussion. Sims gave several reasons why Sum- 
mers' Q may be endogenous and therefore why it is necessary to test for 
exogeneity. For example, shifts in the marginal product of  capital may 
cause  changes  in  Q;  changes  in  investment  demand  and  correlated 
changes in income may induce changes in the discount rate; and changes 
in tax policy itself may be prompted by changes in investment or income. 
The presence of  any of  these  effects would require reinterpretation of 
Summers' results. Sims felt  the  tests  that implicitly  constrain the  tax 
effects to work through Q do not provide a powerful test of Summers' 
theory, because there are such a variety of models and assumptions that 
would give rise to a correlation of Q and investment without necessarily 
implying a causative role to taxes themselves. 